University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 3

Article 7

2013

Breaking Down the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause Ruling in
NFIB v. Sebelius: A Huge Blow to the Federal Government or a
Mere Bump in the Road?
Ellen K. Howard

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Ellen K. Howard, Breaking Down the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause Ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius: A Huge
Blow to the Federal Government or a Mere Bump in the Road?, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 609 (2013).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss3/7

This Student Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship &
Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized
editor of Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact
mmserfass@ualr.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—BREAKING DOWN THE SUPREME COURT’S
SPENDING CLAUSE RULING IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS: A HUGE BLOW TO THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR A MERE BUMP IN THE ROAD?

I. INTRODUCTION
June 28, 2012—it was the moment everyone had been waiting for. It
was the day that the world would finally know whether the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the highly controversial Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”).1 The ruling was a great victory for President Barack Obama and the rest of the Democratic Party—with
one exception. The Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius2 (“NFIB v. Sebelius”) struck down one part of the over
900-page Affordable Care Act: the Medicaid expansion provision.3 The provision required all states “to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to
cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of
the federal poverty line.”4 If a state chose to decline the expansion, it faced
losing all of its pre-Affordable Care Act federal Medicaid funding in the
future.5
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution—otherwise known as the
Spending Clause—gives Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide
for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.”6 The Supreme Court
“ha[s] long recognized that Congress may use this power to grant federal
funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ ‘taking
certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.’”7 Conditional
grants are an extremely important use of Congress’s spending power. This
power generally “allows Congress to adopt policies beyond its enumerated
powers in such areas as education, law enforcement, community development and social services.”8 Conditional spending enables Congress to enlist
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 2019.
2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. See generally id.
4. Id. at 2601 (citation omitted).
5. Id. at 2604.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
7. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
8. Paul L. Posner, The Supreme Court and the Remaking of Federalism, GOVERNING
(July 18, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-supreme-court-health
-care-ruling-coercion-states-federalism.html.
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the states in the implementation of programs designed to achieve federal
goals in these arenas. To illustrate, Congress currently distributes “more
than 950 federal grants [to the states in exchange for their agreements to
adopt] . . . federal mandates, rules[,] and regulations.”9 By accepting so
many federal grants, the states have developed somewhat of an addiction to
federal money.10 As with most addictions, problems can arise for all parties
involved, which was the case with the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v.
Sebelius.
In the decades leading up to the Affordable Care Act, the states had become more dependent on federal Medicaid grants than any other federal
money.11 Thus, while many of the states did not want to expand their Medicaid programs as contemplated by the Affordable Care Act, they felt compelled to do so because they knew that they could not afford to lose all future federal Medicaid funding.12 Accordingly, many of these states challenged the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion condition and took
their case all the way to the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius.13
Although Congress generally has the power under the spending clause
to incentivize the states to accept its conditional grants, it may not coerce
them into doing so.14 As long as Congress merely encourages or induces the
states to enact its federal programs, Congress’s condition will not run afoul
of the Constitution.15 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the states argued that Congress
was using coercion, rather than encouragement, to force them to adopt the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision.16 The Court agreed
with the states and held, for the first time ever,17 that the terms of a conditional spending program crossed the constitutional line from encouragement
to coercion.18
The Court arrived at this conclusion by adopting a new understanding
of what constitutes coercion: “When . . . conditions take the form of threats
to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly
9. Id.
10. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 903 (2013) (using the word “addiction” to explain why one
might question whether the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was coercive to the states).
11. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 2602.
15. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
16. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
17. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
18. Id. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.), 2662
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”19 The
two key elements of this coercion test are “significance” and “independence.”20 Because the original Medicaid funds were so significant in size, and
because Congress used those funds to leverage the states acceptance of an
independent Medicaid program, Congress engaged in coercion.21 While
Congress is still free to “offer[] funds under the Affordable Care Act . . . and
requir[e] that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on
their use[,] . . . Congress is not free to . . . penalize States that choose not to
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid
funding.”22
Since NFIB v. Sebelius, many commentators have wondered what implications the Medicaid ruling will have on Congress’s ability to use its
spending power to create new programs and alter existing programs for the
states.23 Despite the difficulty in determining exactly what impacts NFIB v.
Sebelius will have, the likely outcome is that the vast majority of Congress’s
conditions on federal grant programs will be upheld as constitutional. This
note attempts to demonstrate why this is the case by applying the two coercion elements of NFIB v. Sebelius—significance and independence—to
three federal laws that could be at issue after the ruling: the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB),24 the Clean Air Act (CAA),25 and “Megan’s Law.”26
This note will proceed as follows. Part II discusses the holding of NFIB
v. Sebelius, the plurality and joint dissent’s reasoning underlying that holding, and the opinion that lower courts are likely to follow. Next, Part III applies the plurality’s coercion test to NCLB, the CAA, and “Megan’s Law.”
Finally, Part IV concludes that, while NFIB v. Sebelius at least gives the
states a plausible basis to challenge conditional spending programs, their
chance of successfully invalidating the programs on constitutional grounds
remains slim.
19. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
20. See id. at 2604–06.
21. See id.
22. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
23. See generally, e.g., Carrie Johnson, How the Health Care Ruling Might Affect Civil
Rights, NPR.ORG (July 6, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/06/156378347/howthe-health-care-ruling-might-affect-civil-rights; Laura Ofobike, Making Waves Beyond
Health Care, OHIO.COM (July 23, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://www.ohio.com/editorial/makingwaves-beyond-health-care-1.322169; Jordan Weissmann, The Most Important Part of Today’s Health Care Ruling You Haven’t Heard About, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2012, 3:33
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/the-most-important-part-oftodays-health-care-ruling-you-havent-heard-about/259134/.
24. No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
25. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
26. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
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II. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: THE OPINION
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,27 seven out
of the nine Supreme Court Justices found the Medicaid expansion coercive,
and, thus, an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending power.28 Those
seven Justices, however, split into two separate groups—the plurality and
the joint dissenters.29 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion and
was joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan.30 The four remaining Justices that found the Medicaid expansion coercive—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—signed on to the joint dissent.31 While those four
Justices would have held the expansion provision unconstitutional based on
the plurality’s analysis, they actually took the coercion analysis a step further.32 As such, NFIB v. Sebelius contains two different tests for establishing
unconstitutional coercion.33 Critically, however, the last part of this section
will demonstrate why lower courts are more likely to follow the plurality
opinion than the joint dissent.34 Nevertheless, it is necessary to discuss both
the plurality opinion and the joint dissent because they each highlight spending clause principles and limits that will be informative for future analysis.
A.

The Plurality Opinion

In a novel opinion, Chief Justice Roberts created a new standard for assessing whether Congress has improperly coerced the states via conditional
spending: “When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to
terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly
viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”35 This
framework contains a two-part test. The Court must determine (1) whether
the existing federal grant that Congress is threatening to terminate in the
future is significant, and (2) whether that grant is independent from Congress’s new condition that the states must adopt in order to keep receiving
the original grant.36 The first element focuses on the amount of money at
27. 132 S. Ct. 2566.
28. Id. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan JJ.), 2666–
68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
29. See sources cited supra note 28.
30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2576–77 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
31. Id. at 2642, 2656–57 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
32. See discussion infra Part II.B.
33. See generally infra Parts II.A–C.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (emphasis added).
36. See id. at 2604–06.
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stake and the degree of reliance the states have on that money. 37 The larger
the amount of money and the higher the degree of reliance, the more likely
Congress’s new condition is to be coercive on the states.38 The second element requires a court to decide whether Congress’s new condition is its own
independent program, and whether Congress is using the threatened program as leverage to force states into accepting the new condition.39 The
more the new condition looks like an independent program, the more likely
Congress is using its spending power to coerce the states into accepting the
condition.40
Applying this two-part test, the plurality found Congress’s Medicaid
expansion coercive, and thus, held that Congress exceeded its power under
the Constitution.41 In order to fully understand the test and its application, it
is first necessary to demonstrate how the plurality arrived at this test and
what prompts a coercion analysis.
1.

Prompting a Coercion Analysis

Under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the
power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the
United States.”42 The Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to provide for the general welfare necessarily includes its power to spend for the
general welfare.43 Congress’s power to spend for the “general welfare” has
consistently been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be a very broad power.44 Critically, it is not confined to only the enumerated powers laid out in
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.45 Rather, Congress, through the
spending power alone, has been able to implement numerous spending programs such as, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and even the Affordable Care Act. Congress’s rationale behind instituting programs like these is

37. See id. at 2604–05.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 2605–06. These two elements combined have often been referred to as the
“anti-leveraging principle.” See e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 866.
40. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
41. Id. at 2606–07.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2657–58 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
44. Id. at 2658 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). Justice Scalia,
writing for the joint dissent, explained that “‘[t]he discretion belongs to Congress,’” and
“‘unless the choice is clearly wrong,’” Congress’s expenditure will qualify as spending for
the “‘general welfare.’” Id. (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640).
45. See id. (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 586–87 (1937)).
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that they are good for the “general welfare” of the nation, and Congress usually has some specific purpose it would like to achieve as a result.
Spending Clause legislation has also consistently been regarded “as
‘much in the nature of a contract.’”46 Thus, when Congress, through its
spending power, contracts with the states to implement one of its spending
programs, Congress must adhere to the usual rules of contract, such as offer,
acceptance, and consideration.47 One limitation on Congress’s spending
power, and in contract law, is coercion.48 If Congress intends to offer federal
money in exchange for state compliance with new conditions, the states
must “voluntarily and knowingly accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’”49 To
ensure that state acceptance is voluntary and knowing, rather than coerced,
Congress must provide the states with a “legitimate choice whether to accept
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds.”50 In order for the
states’ choice to be legitimate, that choice must be real, not merely theoretical.51 Otherwise, coercion will result.52
Many of the spending programs that Congress contracts with the states
to implement are heavily funded by federal money. 53 Many of these programs are also implemented mainly by the states.54 Regardless of the significant role the states play in implementing these federal programs, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress may not compel the states
to enact such legislation.55 States are their own separate and independent
sovereigns, and they must be able to govern that way without undue interference from the federal government.56
However, neither the state sovereignty principle nor Congress’s coercion limitation necessarily means that Congress is prohibited from using its
46. Id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
47. See id. at 2602–03; see also, e.g., Zemke v. City of Chi., 100 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir.
1996) (“The elements of a contract, taught like the ABC’s to first-year law students, are offer,
acceptance, and consideration.”).
48. See id. at 2602.
49. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
50. Id. at 2602–03.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Chris Edwards, Fiscal Federalism, DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T 1 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/fiscalfederalism.pdf. The Downsizing the Federal Government website is a project of the CATO
Institute. See generally DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
54. See Edwards, supra note 53, at 1.
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).
56. Id.
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spending power to encourage or induce states to implement and oversee any
federal programs that it thinks are beneficial to the general welfare of the
nation. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that Congress may . . .
grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such . . . grant[s] upon
the States’ ‘taking certain actions that Congress could not [directly] require
them to take.’”57 One of the most common ways Congress induces the states
to implement and oversee programs like Medicaid, for example, is by offering them federal money in exchange for compliance with the terms of the
federal program it wants carried out.58 For example, suppose Congress
writes a bill that says to the states, “[H]ere is some money, but [you can only
have it if you implement these policies] we think [are important].”59 Based
on those facts alone, this would be a clear case of mere constitutional inducement or encouragement because the states could simply decline the
offer without losing anything.60 However, Congress can create an issue
when, in exchange for new conditions to a federal program, Congress not
only offers states additional money but also threatens to stop providing the
funding it currently distributes for that program. A condition like this would
prompt further coercion analysis to test its constitutionality because that
condition could possibly violate the basic principle that the “Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”61 This was one of the primary issues that the Supreme Court
faced in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.62
In NFIB v. Sebelius, Congress included a Medicaid expansion provision in the newly enacted Affordable Care Act.63 This provision required
states to dramatically increase their Medicaid obligations by expanding the
number of needy individuals the original program covered.64 However,
Congress did more than say to the states, “If you expand your Medicaid
programs to cover these new groups, then you can have all of this extra federal money.” Congress also said that, if the states refuse to cover the new
groups, then “not only will we not give you any additional Medicaid money,
57. Id. at 2601 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
58. Edwards, supra note 53, at 1.
59. Erin Ryan, Spending Power Bargaining After Sebelius, OUPBLOG (July 3, 2012,
10:30 AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/07/spending-power-bargaining-after-obamacare/ (essay commenting on the spending power implications of the plurality’s opinion).
60. The joint dissent might disagree with this conclusion. Depending on the size of the
federal grant being offered, this example could constitute coercion under the joint dissent’s
analysis. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
61. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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we will take away all of your original Medicaid funds in the future.”65 The
states argued that this was no longer mere encouragement or inducement but
was actual coercion such that they essentially had no choice but to accept
the Medicaid expansion in order to continue their original Medicaid programs.66 Although the plurality emphasized that conditions that threaten
other funds are not always coercive, it believed that the states had a point in
their argument and that a situation like this prompted a coercion analysis.67
To begin its discussion in NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality first reiterated
the contract and Spending Clause principles68 discussed above.69 Then, the
plurality presented a new way for Congress’s offer to not be legitimate, and,
thus, for coercion to result: “When, for example, [Congress’s new] conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the
States to accept policy changes.”70 This version of coercion contains a twopart test: (1) whether the federal grant being threatened is significant, and
(2) whether the new condition is independent from the current federal program.71
2.

Significance: The Amount of Money at Stake and the Amount of
Reliance Involved

The significance element of the two-part coercion test requires inquiry
into the size of the threatened federal grant and the degree of reliance the
states have on that grant.72 To explain what this means, the plurality reviewed the holding in the seminal case, South Dakota v. Dole.73 In Dole,
Congress passed a law that threatened to withhold five percent of state fed65. See id.
66. Id.
67. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.). See also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 869. As Professor Bagenstos explained, the
Chief Justice “made clear that the determination that Congress has threatened to ‘terminate
significant independent grants’ is the trigger for conducting a coercion analysis, not the conclusion of that analysis.” Id.
68. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
69. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
70. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.). This is not the only way Congress can engage in coercion. The words “for example” in the quote signify that there are other ways in which Congress could engage in coercion. However, the plurality did not elaborate on what those other ways could be. Rather, it
was enough for the plurality to conclude that Congress’s use of the Medicaid expansion met
at least one method of coercion, and, thus, was unconstitutional. See id.
71. See id. at 2604–06.
72. See id. at 2604.
73. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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eral highway funding if the states did not raise their drinking age to twentyone.74 This was a type of situation that prompted a further coercion analysis
because not only did Congress decline to offer additional money under the
law, it threatened the states’ future federal funds under the current highway
program.75 The Court made clear in Dole that for this type of financial inducement to be constitutional, it must give states a real choice, “not merely
in theory but in fact.”76 The Court found that the states had a legitimate
choice in whether to accept or reject the drinking age requirement because
Congress threatened only five percent of state highway funding.77 Because
Congress was only threatening to revoke a small amount of federal funding
paid to the states, this threat was merely “mild encouragement” to raise the
drinking age.78 In other words, while Congress clearly wanted the states to
raise their drinking age and not relinquish any federal money, this was not
coercion because, at the end of the day, the ultimate choice was still up to
the states.79 What mattered to the Court was the size of the federal grant at
stake.80 It found that five percent was simply not a significant enough
amount of money to amount to coercion.81 In fact, if South Dakota chose to
not raise its drinking age and lose five percent of its federal highway funds,
it only stood to lose less than one half of one percent of its state budget at
that time.82 Thus, the choice of “[w]hether to accept the drinking age change
‘remain[ed] the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact.’”83
Although Congress provided the states with a real choice in Dole, it did
not provide that same choice in NFIB v. Sebelius.84 In fact, the plurality went
so far as to call the Medicaid expansion provision “a gun to the head.”85 This
analogy helped further explain what was meant all along by choice in theory
versus choice in fact. In reality, you almost always have the free will to
make a choice—even in a situation where you are robbed at gunpoint.86 In
74. Id. at 205.
75. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
76. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12).
77. Id. at 2604 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
78. Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 630, (8th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 483 U.S.
203 (1987)).
83. Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 2605 n.12 (“‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive proposition whether
you have a single dollar in your pocket or $500.”). See also Richard Epstein, Derailing the
Medicaid Expansion: Chief Justice Roberts Gets This One Right, ADVANCING A FREE SOC’Y
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that situation, you could chose to either give up your money and save your
life, or you could tell the robber no and potentially lose both your life and
your money; however, at least in theory, the choice is still yours. Despite the
fact that there is a choice in theory, the plurality still concluded that “‘your
money or your life’” is in fact “a coercive proposition, whether you have a
single dollar in your pocket or $500.”87 With either option, the chooser remains in a lose/lose situation, which raises the question: while you may have
a choice in theory, is it really one in fact?
Like Dole, NFIB v. Sebelius answered this “real choice” question by
inquiring into the size of the federal grant at stake.88 Unlike in Dole, where
South Dakota stood to lose only less than half of one percent of its state
budget, any state that chose to opt out of the Medicaid expansion stood to
lose all of its future federal Medicaid funding, which accounted for over
twenty percent of the average state’s total budget.89 Moreover, the federal
government contributed a significant amount of money to each state’s Medicaid program.90 One report revealed that federal funds covered fifty to
eighty-three percent of the average state’s entire Medicaid budget.91 With
this much of the states’ Medicaid programs being funded by the federal
government, if Congress took all of the funding away, what would even be
left of Medicaid? The fact that the states stood to lose such a large amount
of money from their overall budgets and Medicaid programs did not sit well
with the plurality. To the plurality, Congress’s threat to terminate all of the
states’ Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the expansion amounted to
“economic dragooning,” such that the states essentially had no real choice in
fact.92

(June 28, 2012, 10:22 PM), http://www.advancingafreesociety.org/exclusive/topics/healthcare/derailing-the-medicaid-expansion-chief-justice-roberts-gets-this-one-right/; Mario Loyola, The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Medicaid, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 29, 2012, 5:08 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/304474/supreme-courts-ruling-medicaid-marioloyola. Although both Mr. Loyola and Professor Epstein believe that the coercion line was
once again drawn in the wrong place, they still found that the plurality ultimately made the
right decision. Professor Epstein explained that there is a more sensible way to draw the line
between inducement and coercion: “[I]f I promise you something that I own to get you to do
what I would like, it is an inducement. If I threaten to take away something that you own, it is
a threat.” Epstein, supra. According to Professor Epstein, it is the “initial allocation of property rights [that] matters[,]” and “it makes no sense to say that the robber who wants only 5
percent of your money for car fare has not coerced you.” Id.
87. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 n.12 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
88. See id. at 2604.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2604–05.
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Additionally, implicit in the discussion of the significance element was
the concept of reliance. For years now, the states had heavily relied on this
large federal grant to fund their Medicaid programs.93 Through the use of
their federal money, “the States have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many decades to implement their
objectives under existing Medicaid.”94 Thus, if a state chose to opt out of the
expansion and lose all federal funds, efforts to structure a well-functioning
Medicaid program would be futile.95
The states’ heavy reliance coupled with their potential loss of significant federal funding assisted the plurality in concluding that Congress gave
the states no real choice in fact.96 Like the gun to the head analogy, the states
could, against their will, expand their Medicaid programs as the Affordable
Care Act provided or they could decline to do so and face losing what would
essentially be their lives—a substantial amount of money that they relied on
for years. They had a choice—at least in theory; however, either of these
options leaves the chooser with no real choice in fact, and Congress cannot
use its spending power to coerce the states into making such a choice.97
The plurality wanted to make clear, however, that it was not taking the
role of the states’ protective mother. It explained that the Court will always
“look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to
embrace the federal policies as their own.”98 In other words, the states are
not children; they are adults and should be able to tell Congress no if they do
not want to adopt a certain policy—large amount of money or not. After all,
“States are separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act
like it.”99 But here, there was more going on than the states just running to
the Court for help because they could not possibly resist Congress’s dangling carrot.100 This particular federal grant was so significant not only because of its size, but because the states had heavily relied on it.101 To take
93. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 870 (“But as the Chief Justice’s reference
to the ‘loss’ of funds suggests, the amount of money at stake was not important in and of
itself; it was important because states had come to rely upon federal Medicaid funds to provide a major portion of their revenues.”).
94. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 2604–05.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2603 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).
99. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 2604.
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that grant away from the states now, if they did not accept Congress’s terms,
would be near Armageddon for most state budgets. To the states, that was
no real choice—it was literally their money or their life. Thus, while the
threat of withholding all of a state’s funding in a heavily entrenched federal
program will not always amount to coercion in and of itself, when coupled
with significant reliance, Congress’s condition is more likely coercive.102
The significance of the threatened program is only one element of the
new coercion test adopted by the plurality. The second element concerns the
“independence” of that program from the new conditions being offered.103
3.

Independence: Additional Condition or Completely Different
Program?

In determining whether the Medicaid expansion was coercive, the plurality ruled it was necessary to analyze whether the expansion was an independent program apart from the original Medicaid program. 104 This independence element is met when Congress creates a new condition that is independent and distinct from the original program Congress is purporting to
modify, and Congress uses that program’s grant as leverage to force the
states to accept the new condition.105
To better understand independence, it is first necessary to explain what
is commonly referred to as the “germaneness test.”106 This test is not an element of coercion.107 Rather, it is a wholly separate limitation on Congress’s
spending power.108 Under the germaneness test, any condition that Congress
places on a federal grant must be reasonably related to the purpose of that
expenditure.109 In Dole, for example, Congress’s condition met the germaneness test because the drinking age was “directly related to . . . safe interstate travel.”110 This additional limitation on Congress’s spending power
should not be confused with whether a condition is independent enough to
constitute coercion. A condition may be germane or related to the purpose of
a federal grant and simultaneously be independent of that grant as well,
which was the case in NFIB v. Sebelius.111 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Medicaid
102. See id.
103. See id. at 2605–06.
104. Id.
105. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
106. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987).
107. Id. at 207.
108. Id. at 208 n.3.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 208.
111. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132. S. Ct. 2566, 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.)
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); see also Bagenstos supra note 10, at 918.
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expansion was germane to the purpose of the original Medicaid program—
healthcare coverage for the nation’s poor.112
At the same time, however, the plurality concluded that, in reality, the
title of “expansion” was a mere label, and Congress created an entirely new
program independent of the original Medicaid program. 113 The original
Medicaid program required states to provide medical assistance to “needy
persons.”114 Specifically, the program targeted “four particular categories of
the needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children.”115 Through the expansion, Congress sought to expand
these categories of needy people to include “all individuals under the age of
65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.”116 The government argued that Congress reserved its right to make this change because
the original Medicaid agreement with the states provided that Congress
would have the power to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program as it
developed.117 According to the government, “alter” or “amend” is exactly
what Congress did.118
Justice Ginsburg, one of the two dissenting Justices on the spending
clause issue, agreed with the government’s position.119 She explained that
the Medicaid expansion was not an independent program but was simply a
mere alteration of the original Medicaid agreement.120 Thus, although Congress originally determined that only four particular categories of individuals qualified as “needy persons” eligible for Medicaid, now Congress
Chief Justice Roberts did not expressly state that the expansion was germane to the purpose
of Medicaid. However, he implied that the expansion met the germaneness test when he
analogized it to the facts of Dole. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality
opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). Despite the Chief Justice’s lack of mention, Justice
Ginsburg confirmed that the expansion was germane to Medicaid in the dissent. Id. at 2634–
35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
112. See NFIB, 132. S. Ct. at 2634–35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.) (“The ACA, in contrast,
relates solely to the federally funded Medicaid program . . . [F]ederal funds will be spent on
health care for the poor in furtherance of Congress’ present perception of the general welfare.”).
113. Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
114. Id. at 2605.
115. Id. at 2605–06.
116. Id. at 2601.
117. See id. at 2605.
118. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
119. See id. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
120. See id. at 2636–39. Justice Ginsburg argued that the states expressly agreed that
Congress was allowed to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program, and, furthermore, the
states are accustomed to Congress changing programs in this way. See id.
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deemed “needy persons” should include those four groups and nonelderly
people with incomes below 133% of the poverty level.121
Despite the dissent’s argument, the plurality found the Medicaid expansion met the independence element.122 Congress created a new condition,
the Medicaid expansion, which was independent and distinct from the original Medicaid program; Congress used the original Medicaid grant as leverage to force the states to accept the expansion.123 Rather than simply expanding the boundaries of the four original categories, the expansion turned
Medicaid into “an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”124 To illustrate, the plurality referred to
the manner in which Congress structured the expansion. In Dole, for example, the drinking age condition was independent of the highway program
because it “was not a restriction on how [South Dakota’s] highway funds . . .
were to be used.”125 Similarly, the Medicaid expansion did not restrict how
the states were allowed to use their original Medicaid funding. In fact, Congress provided that the new recipients under the expansion would not even

121. Id. The Chief Justice explained that he was not prepared to conclude that the Medicaid expansion was a real expansion simply because Congress deemed it so. Id. at 2605
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). However, Justice Ginsburg noted that “Courts owe a large measure of respect to Congress’ characterization of the
grant programs it establishes[,]” and “Congress has broad authority to construct or adjust
spending programs to meet its contemporary understanding of “the general Welfare.” Id. at
2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.). After analyzing both the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s
arguments, it appears that the independence element may be even more difficult to determine
than the significance element. It seems this decision came down to hair splitting. On the one
hand, the Medicaid expansion was simply a further expansion of what Congress considered
“needy persons,” and, thus, Congress simply did what it has always been allowed to do—
amend the law to include that new group. On the other hand, the expansion also looks like
such a significant transformation of the original Medicaid program that it becomes a different
healthcare program. The Chief Justice emphasized this point in the plurality opinion: “It is no
longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.” Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.)
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). In the end, however, it was the Chief
Justice’s conclusion that carried the day.
122. See id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
123. Id.
124. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
125. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918. The Court in Dole did not expressly conclude that
the drinking age condition was independent of South Dakota’s highway funding. Chief Justice Roberts made this point about the facts of Dole for the first time in NFIB v. Sebelius.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan). The
likely reason behind the Court’s lack of independence discussion in Dole is that the threatened highway funds were so obviously insignificant that it would be unnecessary to elaborate
on the coercion requirement any further.
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be funded with money from the original program.126 Rather, “Congress created a separate funding provision to cover the costs” of the newly eligible
recipients.127 In addition to separate funds, the Medicaid expansion was independent of the original Medicaid program because “[t]he conditions on
use of the different funds [were] also distinct.”128 For example, persons that
were newly eligible under the expansion would receive less comprehensive
coverage than persons under the current Medicaid program. 129 According to
the plurality, this was much more than a mere shift in degree—it was “a
shift in kind”130—and when Congress creates an independent program like
this, it may not coerce acceptance by using the states’ participation in a separate program as leverage.131
Moreover, it was irrelevant that the original Medicaid agreement said
Congress could “alter” or “amend” the program, because it was a completely different program.132 Allowing Congress to revoke all of a state’s original
126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2605.
131. Id. at 2607.
132. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, took issue with the government’s
argument that the states were put on notice with the language “alter” or “amend.” One of the
limitations on Congress’s spending power is that all “conditions must be unambiguous so that
a State at least knows what it is getting into” when it accepts federal conditions and money.
Id. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Although Congress’s “‘spending power is
broad, it does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance or “retroactive”
conditions.’” Id. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.)
(quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.). According to the plurality, “[a] State could [have] hardly anticipate[d] that . . . ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ . . . included the power to transform [the Medicaid
program] so dramatically.” Id. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, took issue with this
conclusion. While she agreed that “Congress must provide clear notice of conditions it might
later impose[,]” the plurality had gone too far with its understanding of notice. Id. at 2637
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(joined by Sotomayor, J.). Under the plurality’s understanding of notice, at the law’s inception in 1965, Congress should have warned the states of any and every possible future change
it would make to Medicaid. Id. Not only is this impossible, but, as Justice Ginsburg explained, past “decisions do not support such a requirement.” Id. While some might feel
strongly, one way or the other, about which opinion was correct in this instance, the notice
requirement may be irrelevant. It is hard to imagine that the plurality would have reversed its
conclusion on the independence element of coercion if Congress had simply written in the
original Medicaid agreement, “We have the right to engage in coercion in the future.” The
plurality held that Congress may not use a current spending program as leverage to force
states to accept some other separate and independent program. Thus, it is unlikely that the
plurality would have accepted an agreement between Congress and the states that allowed
Congress to use this type of leveraging technique. With or without notice, the Medicaid ex-
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Medicaid funds if it did not implement a new and independent Medicaid
program, would be allowing Congress to engage in coercion—period.133
Thus, based on the significant size of the original Medicaid program and
Congress’s use of leveraging to force the states to implement a completely
independent healthcare program, it was not hard for the plurality to conclude
that Congress was engaging in coercion, and, therefore, exceeded its power
under the spending clause.134
B.

The Joint Dissent

Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito were the remaining four
Justices that voted in favor of holding that the Medicaid expansion exceeded
Congress’s spending power under the constitution.135 While the plurality
found the expansion coercive based on the independence of the expansion
and the significant size of the Medicaid grant, the joint dissenters primarily
focused on the latter, and, in turn, created a much broader coercion analysis.136 The joint dissenters expanded both ways Congress’s conditions could
prompt a coercion analysis and the scope of what constitutes coercion.137
Before doing this, however, there were three important limitations on Congress’s spending power that were first necessary to address.138
1.

The Joint Dissent’s Setup for its Coercion Analysis

The joint dissenters began their discussion of the structural limitations
on Congress’s spending clause power by explaining three important requirements for Congress’s use of conditions: (1) the “conditions must be
unambiguous so that a State at least knows what it is getting into”; (2) the
“[c]onditions must . . . be related ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs’”; and (3) “while Congress may seek to induce
States to accept conditional grants, Congress may not cross the ‘point at
which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement.’”139 Of
pansion would still be coercive, and Congress cannot get away with violating the Constitution—even if it gives the proper advance notice that it plans to do so. My thanks to Professor
Joshua Silverstein of UALR William H. Bowen School of Law for helping me develop this
argument. Interview with Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, UALR William H. Bowen
School of Law, in Little Rock, Ark. (Jan. 25, 2013).
133. Id. 2606–07 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
134. See id. at 2604–07.
135. Id. at 2666–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
136. See infra Part II.B.2.
137. See infra Part II.B.2.
138. See infra Part II.B.1.
139. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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these three limitations, only the third raised a serious concern.140 Like the
plurality, the joint dissent focused on the third requirement because it addressed the central question of whether Congress engaged in coercion with
its use of the Medicaid expansion.141 Thus, the joint dissent’s discussion of
the first two requirements was brief.
The second requirement describes what this note previously referred to
as the “the germaneness test.”142 This test requires that federal conditions be
related to a particular purpose of their federal expenditure.143 The joint dissent only briefly mentions the germaneness test.144 Perhaps the reasoning
behind this requirement’s lack of discussion in both the plurality and joint
dissent’s opinions was that it was so obviously met. It would be hard to dispute that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was not related to
one of the main purposes for which Medicaid funds are expended—
healthcare coverage for America’s poor. Thus, while it may be necessary to
address this point when considering how a post-NFIB v. Sebelius legal landscape applies to other federal spending programs, it is understandable why
neither the plurality nor the joint dissent thought it was necessary to discuss
germaneness any further than a mere mention.
The first requirement, unambiguous conditions, was also not discussed
much further than a mere mention. Unlike the plurality, which used this
requirement to lead into a discussion of the third requirement’s (coercion)
independence element,145 the joint dissent did not inquire into it at all. As
established earlier, the only requirement that the plurality and joint dissent
thought was relevant was the third requirement, coercion.146
Although the plurality and joint dissent agreed that coercion was the
only important requirement to fully address, the opinions differed in their
analysis of that requirement. In particular, the joint dissent’s coercion analysis differed both qualitatively and quantitatively from the plurality in many
ways.147 It broadened not only the ways Congress’s conditions could prompt
a coercion analysis, but also the scope of what constitutes coercion.148

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 2660.
See id.
See supra Part II.A.3.
E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
See id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
See id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.2.
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The Joint Dissent’s Significantly Broader Coercion Analysis

The joint dissent’s coercion analysis differed from the plurality’s in
many ways. To illustrate their differences, the joint dissent offered the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for example, that Congress enacted legislation offering each
State a grant equal to the State’s entire annual expenditures for primary
and secondary education. Suppose also that this funding came with conditions governing such things as school curriculum, the hiring and tenure
of teachers, the drawing of school districts, the length and hours of the
school day, the school calendar, a dress code for students, and rules for
student discipline. As a matter of law, a State could turn down that offer,
but if it did so, its residents would not only be required to pay the federal
taxes needed to support this expensive new program, but they would also
be forced to pay an equivalent amount in state taxes. And if the State
gave in to the federal law, the State and its subdivisions would surrender
their traditional authority in the field of education. 149

The joint dissent concluded that a situation like the hypothetical would
constitute coercion.150 This opinion demonstrates a much broader version of
coercion than the plurality’s version. Prior to the creation of the Medicaid
expansion, all of the states had previously accepted, and were currently executing, the original Medicaid program.151 Furthermore, Congress’s condition, the Medicaid expansion, contained both an offer and a threat: if the
states choose to accept the expansion, they would gain additional funding,
but if the states choose to decline the expansion, they would lose future
funding under the original Medicaid program.152 None of these characteristics were present in the hypothetical.
First, the joint dissent extended the manner in which Congress’s conditions could prompt a coercion analysis. Through this hypothetical, the dissent opened the door to the possibility that Congress’s first-time offer of a
new program could prompt a coercion analysis.153 Notice that in this hypothetical, Congress is offering the states a completely new education program
for the first time.154 Additionally, a threat of withholding future funding is
not required to prompt a coercion analysis under the joint dissent’s hypo-

149. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2661–62.
151. See Medicaid Enrollment by State, MEDICAID.GOV, http://medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-information/By-State/By-State.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
152. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
153. See id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
154. See id.
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thetical.155 In the hypothetical, Congress is only offering education funding
to the states and not threatening to take anything away.156 Thus, under the
joint dissent’s reasoning, Congress’s new condition could prompt a coercion
analysis when it either threatens to revoke the states’ significant future funding or when it merely offers the states a large amount of additional funding.157 Once it is established that a fact pattern prompts a coercion analysis,
an actual coercion test should be applied next. The joint dissent modified
this too, and in two different ways.
The first way that the joint dissent modified the plurality’s coercion test
was by disregarding the plurality’s “independence” element and focusing
entirely on what the plurality called “significance.”158 Thus, it seemed unimportant to the joint dissent whether Congress was leveraging a state’s participation in one program to force it to participate in another program. 159 Rather, the size—and only the size—of the federal grant was crucial.160 In other
words, the joint dissent found only what the plurality termed “significance”
to be relevant.161
The second, and final, way that the joint dissent modified the plurality’s coercion test was by developing a broader understanding of the plurality’s notion of significance. The joint dissent’s hypothetical shows that, unlike the plurality, it did not find the reliance factor important. In the hypo155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 2662. I separate the joint dissent’s opinion in this manner in an attempt to
clarify the differences between the joint dissenters and the plurality. A mere offer, in and of
itself, will not prompt a coercion analysis. The offer would need to be coupled with a significant amount of funds for a coercion analysis to be necessary. See infra Part II.B.3.
158. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). The joint dissent never specifically stated that it found the plurality’s “independence”
element irrelevant. Rather, the joint dissent simply never mentioned the element in its coercion analysis. Additionally, unlike the plurality, the joint dissent never flat-out referred to its
coercion test as requiring a “significance” element. Nevertheless, the joint dissent’s explanation of coercion is similar enough to the plurality’s significance element that it is proper to
analogize the two. Compare id., with id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (both opinions discussing the coerciveness of a program in relation to
the size of the federal grant at issue).
159. Although the joint dissent concluded that the Medicaid expansion was coercive
without the plurality’s “independence” element, this does not necessarily mean that the joint
dissent would entirely disregard this element in future coercion analyses. It is quite possible
that the joint dissent would use this element in the future to find another federal program
coercive. Perhaps if a situation like NFIB arose again, but this time the program was not as
significant as Medicaid, then the joint dissent might refer to the plurality’s independence
element for guidance. However, as I explain in Part II.C, while this might be the case for this
element in the future, the joint dissent certainly does not require this element today.
160. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
161. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 153.
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thetical, Congress had never previously offered the program or money at
issue.162 Rather, the hypothetical sets up a first time offer and acceptance
situation between Congress and the states, and, therefore, reliance was not
even an issue.163 What the joint dissent centered its significance analysis on
instead were the possible tax consequences the states would bear if they
declined Congress’s offer.164 Like the plurality, the joint dissent reiterated
that Congress must give states a legitimate choice in whether to accept or
decline a federal program, and that choice must be “not merely in theory but
in fact.”165 In the hypothetical, at least in theory, the states could either decline or accept Congress’s offer. If a state chose to decline the offer, that
state’s citizens would still bear the burden of paying federal taxes to support
the education program for the other states that chose to accept the program.166 However, if that state is still required to pay the heavy tax price for
declining the program anyway, then what choice does it really have?167 The
other option would be to accept and implement a program it never wanted
from the beginning.168 Again, is that a real choice? Allowing the federal
government to engage in a situation like this would essentially put the states
in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation—i.e., coercion. Using the plurality’s terms, the joint dissent would call a similar hypothetical
situation, “a gun to the head,” which exceeds Congress’s spending power in
the Constitution.169
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, however, “[a] State . . . has no claim
on the money its residents pay in federal taxes.”170 While the joint dissent
acknowledged that her point was “true as a formal matter[,]” as a practical
matter, her point falls flat.171 According to the joint dissent, “unless Justice
Ginsburg thinks that there is no limit to the amount of money that can be
squeezed out of taxpayers, heavy federal taxation diminishes the practical
ability of States to collect their own taxes.”172 In other words, where does
162. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2662–64.
165. Id. at 2661 (alteration in original) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
211–12 (1987)).
166. Id. at 2661–62.
167. Id.
168. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Justice Scalia, writing for the joint dissent, notes that it is also important for the Court to
disallow a situation like the hypothetical because Congress would be coercing the states into
accepting its policies in an area that has been traditionally left up to states. Id.
169. Compare id. (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), with id. at 2604
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
170. Id. at 2640 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
171. Id. at 2662 n.13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting),
172. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg think the states are going to turn for money if their own
citizens have already been tapped out?
Therefore, regardless of any leveraging by Congress, and regardless of
any state reliance on a federal program, when the government offers or
threatens to withhold a federal grant that is so large that a refusal of it would
result in a huge tax increase, there is a strong case that coercion is present. 173
Once the joint dissent established its version of coercion, it then went on to
explain why the Medicaid expansion clearly met this meaning.174
3.

Why the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion is Coercive:
Size

Acknowledging the difficulty in determining when Congress has
crossed the line from enticement to coercion, the joint dissent noted,
“[C]ourts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional . . . unless
the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”175 However, if it is not
clear that Congress crossed the line into coercion in this case, “then there is
no such [anticoercion] rule.”176 Using its own coercion analysis, the joint
dissent found the threatened Medicaid grant significant.177 The reasoning
behind this finding was the grant’s size and detrimental tax consequences.178
Any state that declined the expansion and lost its original Medicaid grant
would be unable to compensate its Medicaid program in state tax revenues.179 Of course, the states could always raise additional revenue through
taxation to fund their own Medicaid programs; however, this was not a real
option.180 The joint dissent explained that “Medicaid has long been the largest federal program of grants to the States[,]” and that “[t]he States devote a
larger percentage of their budgets to Medicaid than to any other item.”181 For
example, Arizona “commits 12% of its state expenditures to Medicaid, and
relies on the Federal Government to provide the rest.”182 In fact, if Arizona
lost its original federal Medicaid funding, it would “have to commit an additional 33% of all its state expenditures to fund an equivalent state pro-

173.
174.
ing).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
ing).
181.
182.

Id. at 2661–62.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissentId. at 2662.
Id.
Id. at 2662–64.
Id.
Id.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 n.13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissentId. at 2662–63.
Id. at 2663.
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gram[,]” which would result in Arizona having “to allocate 45% of its annual expenditures for that one purpose.”183
Moreover, not only would a state have to pick up the slack with its own
revenues to cover its significantly depleted Medicaid program, the state
would still be required to follow other federal laws and fund those laws entirely on its own.184 One example of this that the joint dissent thought was
significant was the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).185 This law requires hospitals to treat any indigent patient that
comes into their emergency room needing assistance.186 With many of these
indigent patients being covered by Medicaid, how could the government
realistically expect a state to comply with EMTALA without any federal
funding?
With such a large amount of money at stake, the states could not seriously refuse the expansion.187 They were simply not given a real choice in
the matter.188 Rather, Congress put the states in a “damned if you do,
damned if you don’t” situation with the Medicaid expansion, which according to the joint dissent, constituted coercion.
Additionally, the joint dissent found the Medicaid expansion coercive
because Congress knew of the threatened Medicaid grant’s significance.189
According to the joint dissent, Congress really showed its hand when it
wrote the expansion because it crafted it in a way that practically admitted
the states had no choice.190
4.

Why the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion is Coercive:
Congress Admitted there was No Choice

The original Medicaid grant that Congress threatened to terminate was
significant not only because it would result in an enormous loss to the states,
but also because there was evidence that Congress knew how significant the
potential loss of funding was.191 Although this was not a separate factor in
and of itself, the joint dissent explained that the way Congress structured the
Medicaid expansion was further evidence of significance.192 “The stated goal
of the [Affordable Care Act] is near-universal health care coverage.”193
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 2664.
Id.; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 2664–66.
Id.
See id.
Id.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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However, if a state actually chose to opt out of the expansion, where would
persons whose income is below the federal poverty line and who could not
afford private insurance go for health care coverage?194 Moreover, where
would those groups who were eligible for the original Medicaid program go
if the states that opted out of the expansion could not afford to keep the original program running on their own?195 There was simply no legitimate backup plan for these vulnerable groups to turn to for health care coverage.196
True, none of those people would be required to pay the penalty for not having health insurance; however, that still would not change the fact that those
individuals would be uninsured.197 Thus, why would Congress ever allow
the primary goal of its legislation to be frustrated so easily? According to the
joint dissent, there was no way Congress would seriously allow this to happen, and, in fact, that is precisely why Congress chose to write the Affordable Care Act the way that it did—a way in which states had no real
choice.198
The government attempted to defend itself by asserting that Congress
was merely offering states an “exceedingly generous” gift with the expansion; however, the joint dissent did not buy that explanation.199 To the contrary, if Congress was being so generous, then why the need for the threatening statutory language providing that the states would lose all of their Medicaid funds if they refused the expansion?200 Rather than threatening the
states, Congress could have simply offered them new funding and conditioned their acceptance of it on compliance with the Medicaid expansion’s
terms.201 According to the joint dissent, the expansion was not tailored in
that way because Congress never wanted to give the states a choice.202
Furthermore, the joint dissenters found the expansion was not a generous gift at all. According to the joint dissent, there were many logical reasons why a state would want to reject this so-called “exceedingly generous”
gift.203 For example, although the government agreed that it would pay
100% of the expansion’s costs, after 2019, that percentage would drop to
90%.204 While this ten percent drop would still require the government to
194. See id. at 2665.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (“These features of the [Affordable Care Act] convey an unmistakable message:
Congress never dreamed that any State would refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid. Congress well understood that refusal was not a practical option.”).
199. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.

632

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

pay the majority of the expansion’s costs, the states would still financially
suffer as a result. To illustrate, after this ten percent drop occurred, state
spending would be “projected to increase by at least $20 billion.”205 Considering the fact that many states are already running at significant budget deficits, it was not difficult to see why an additional $20 billion loss to those
states would not be regarded as a “generous gift.”206 Thus, because this serious downside for the states conflicted with Congress’s strong desire to
achieve its goal of near-universal health care coverage, Congress obviously
wrote the expansion in a way that would give the states no real option but
acceptance.207
All of this evidence of Congress’s intent cemented the joint dissent’s
conclusion that the funding at stake was significant enough to constitute
coercion.208 In the minds of the joint dissenters, Congress all but flat-out
admitted it was coercing the states into expanding their Medicaid programs.209 Thus, this additional evidence of significance coupled with the size
of the enormous loss in funding at stake led to the conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending power.210
Although the joint dissent and the plurality differ in their analysis, they
both still contribute to the ultimate holding of NFIB v. Sebelius. However,
when it comes to which opinion is binding, only one of the two opinions can
control.
C.

Choosing an Opinion that Controls

Although seven Justices concluded that the Medicaid expansion was
coercive, those seven Justices were split between the two different coercion
opinions—the plurality and the joint dissent.211 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Kagan signed on to the plurality,212 while Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy signed on to the joint dissent.213 The final two
remaining Justices that disagreed entirely with the other seven, and found

205. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id. (“In sum, it is perfectly clear from the goal and structure of the ACA that the
offer of the Medicaid Expansion was one that Congress understood no State could refuse.”).
210. See id. at 2661–66.
211. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642.
212. Id. at 2576 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
213. See id. at 2642, 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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that the Medicaid expansion was not coercive, were Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Sotomayor.214
Out of the two possible controlling opinions, the lower courts will likely follow the plurality’s opinion. Although Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Kagan differed from Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
by finding the Medicaid expansion coercive, all five of those Justices ultimately concluded that the expansion should remain in place and that the
states should be provided with the opportunity to accept or reject the provision.215 In contrast, the four joint dissenters would not have given the states
this opportunity because they invalidated the entire Affordable Care Act.216
Furthermore, because the joint dissent’s opinion is much broader in scope
than the plurality’s opinion, it essentially encompasses the plurality’s narrower opinion.217 Thus, we can anticipate that those seven Justices would
strike down any law that is unconstitutional under the plurality opinion, but
only the four dissenters would strike down a law under the pure significance
test for coercion articulated in the joint dissent.218 Finally, because the other
two dissenting Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, did not even find
the expansion coercive, we can assume that if the three Justices of the plurality opinion upheld a law as constitutional under their analysis, then Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would also find that law constitutional.219
Therefore, the better view is that the plurality opinion is the governing law,
and going forward, lower courts that want to avoid reversal on a spending
clause issue should apply the plurality’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius.
III. IMPLICATIONS FROM NFIB V. SEBELIUS
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,220 many have questioned whether its holding
will remain limited to the uniquely large and entrenched Medicaid program
or whether it will be looked back on as D-Day for Congress’s spending
power.221 Because the plurality opinion should be the controlling opinion for
lower courts, the more likely answer is the former. While the plurality did
214. See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
215. See id. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.);
id. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 866.
216. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see
also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 866.
217. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 866.
218. Id. at 867–68.
219. See id.
220. 132 S. Ct. 2566.
221. See sources cited supra note 23.
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not give us the clearest of coercion tests, it at least gave us something to
work with: If Congress threatens to withhold a significant amount of a
state’s federal funding in a heavily entrenched government program unless
that state implements its new independent program, Congress has crossed
the constitutional line from inducement to coercion.222 To determine whether
the threatened federal funding meets the significance element of NFIB v.
Sebelius, it is necessary to examine the size of the federal grant at stake and
how reliant the states are on that grant in relation to its size.223 To determine
whether Congress’s new condition is such a meaningful departure from the
original program that it meets the independence element, it is necessary to
analyze the kinds of changes Congress is making and how they govern the
use of the federal funds at stake.224
This section of the note will apply the two coercion elements from the
plurality opinion to three different laws under which Congress has threatened to withhold funding from the states if they do not comply with new
conditions. The first law that this section will analyze is the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB),225 which requires “[s]tates to implement statewide accountability systems [to] cover[] all public schools and students.”226 The
next law that this section will analyze is the Clean Air Act (CAA)227—a law
that “requires states and local communities to implement programs that help
them meet national pollution limits.”228 The final law that this section will
analyze is “Megan’s Law,” which requires states to report information about
registered child sex offenders to certain agencies in order to receive federal
law enforcement funding.229 Analysis of each of these laws using the plurality’s opinion will show that although these three laws could potentially be
vulnerable under any interpretation of the plurality’s coercion test, a state’s
chance at successfully challenging any of these laws is still quite low.

222. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 2605–06.
225. See generally No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2006 & Supp. V
2011).
226. Allison Quick, Briefing Paper No. 19, Legal Limits on Conditional Spending Including Recent Challenges to No Child Left Behind, HARV. LAW SCH. 2 (May 2, 2006),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/NoChild_19.pdf (Harvard Law Sch. Fed.
Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 19).
227. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671a (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
228. J. Lester Feder & Darren Samuelsohn, The Medicaid Ruling’s Ripple Effect,
POLITICO (July 3, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78091_
Page2.html.
229. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16921, 16925 (2006).
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The No Child Left Behind Act

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was enacted “to increase the proficiency of students in underachieving school districts”230 by
strengthening state accountability systems.231 NCLB has been said to have
“changed the traditional role of the federal government in education.”232 The
Supreme Court has even called NCLB “a dramatic shift in federal educational policy.”233 Due to the holding in NFIB v. Sebelius, NCLB is now more
vulnerable to an attack under the spending clause than ever before.
Because of the ever-evolving role that the federal government has
played in state primary and secondary education policies, it was only a matter of time before Congress enacted something like NCLB. In 1980, Congress and then-President Jimmy Carter converted the original 1867 Department of Education into a cabinet-level department.234 Since then, the role of
the federal government in state education has continued to grow.235 During
the Cold War in 1958, “[t]o help ensure that highly trained individuals
would be available to help America compete with the Soviet Union in scientific and technical fields,” Congress passed its first comprehensive education
legislation: The National Defense Education Act (NDEA).236 Then, in 1964,
while still battling the Cold War, the United States chose to take on another
war—“The War on Poverty.”237 To fight this War on Poverty, Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).238 The largest
funding program that Congress created under ESEA was Title I.239 Congress
designed Title I with the purpose of “provid[ing] financial assistance . . . to
local educational agencies [that] serv[ed] areas with concentrations of children from low-income families; and . . . expand[ing] and improv[ing] their
educational programs by various means . . . which contribute[d] particularly

230. Andrew G. Caffrey, Note, No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion of the Clear
Statement Rule and the Unfunded Mandates Clause of No Child Left Behind, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1129, 1131 (2010).
231. Id. at 1130; Quick, supra note 226, at 2.
232. Quick, supra note 226, at 19.
233. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 461 (2009).
234. E.g., The Federal Role in Education, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview
/fed/role.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
235. Quick, supra note 226, at 17.
236. The Federal Role in Education, supra note 234.
237. See Robert Siegel, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, NPR (Jan. 8, 2004, 12:00
AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1589660.
238. See, e.g., The Federal Role in Education, supra note 234.
239. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1133.
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to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”240
However, after Congress reauthorized ESEA in 1988, it realized that
Title I funding was only reaching twenty percent of the nation’s eligible
students.241 Congress determined this was the cause of the “continuing
achievement gap between students of different socio-economic, racial, ethnic, and language backgrounds,” and, therefore, Congress took a bolder step
with its education policies.242 “[C]onsistent with its overarching theme of
helping disadvantaged and underfunded schools, students, and parents
alike[,]”243 Congress reauthorized Title I of ESEA as NCLB in 2002.244 By
reauthorizing the ESEA into NCLB, Congress required states to comply
with a number of new conditions in order for them to continue receiving
federal education funds under Title I.245 The centerpiece for all of these new
NCLB conditions was accountability.246 Congress wanted to demonstrate
student progress through accountability reforms, rather than “focusing on
how much money school districts spend on each child or ‘dictating funding
levels.’”247 As Justice Sutton stated in his concurring opinion in School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of
Education,248
[T]he act furthers an essential objective . . . of its title—that no child,
whether living in inner-city school districts or not, whether suffering
from learning disabilities or not, whether English is their second language or not, whether otherwise disadvantaged or not, would be left behind when it came to ensuring not just that more resources were devoted
to their education but that objectively measurable progress would be
made in their education.249

By reauthorizing ESEA into NCLB, if the states desired to continue receiving Title I funding, that funding was on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with
240. Part I: Title I in Perspective, NSBA.ORG, http://www.nsba.org/bookreports/title1
/PartI.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). “The National School Boards Association (NSBA) is
a not-for-profit organization representing State Associations of school boards and their member districts across the United States.” Mission, Vision & Goals, NSBA.ORG,
http://www.nsba.org/About/NSBAGovernance (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
241. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1132.
242. Quick, supra note 226, at 19.
243. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1131.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 1133.
246. E.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 286
(6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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NCLB. Thus, if a state chose to remain a recipient of federal Title I funding,
it needed to opt in to NCLB. However, even if a state did not want to opt in
to NCLB, it would have been difficult for it to decline the program because
Title I funding “remains ‘the largest source of states’ elementary education
funding from the federal government.’”250
NCLB could prompt a coercion analysis because any state that does not
want to accept the new version of ESEA—NCLB—faces losing essentially
all of its federal education funds, with the exception of certain discretionary
grant programs.251 Therefore, it is necessary to apply the plurality’s twoelement coercion test in order to determine whether NCLB would remain a
constitutional use of Congress’s spending power.
1.

Significance

Although the federal government provides a significant amount of Title
I funding to the states, it is unlikely that its amount satisfies the plurality’s
significance element. State funding under Title I of NCLB is “based on the
amount of poor and disadvantaged children in the state.”252 “The average
state receives nearly half a billion dollars each year under Title I and the
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] [(IDEA)], and primary and
secondary education makes up just under a fifth of the average state’s budget.”253 Total federal funding for elementary and secondary education programs for fiscal year 2012 amounted to only a little over $35 billion.254
While still a large amount of money, that is almost $198 billion less than the
amount of federal funds that went to pre-expansion Medicaid.255 Moreover,
unlike state Medicaid programs, which receive anywhere from fifty to
eighty-three percent of their funding from the federal government,256
“[s]tates and school districts remain responsible for the majority of [their]
funding for public education.”257 Arizona, for example, receives “federal
education funds [that] amount to only 9.8% of all state expenditures,” while

250. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1133.
251. See Quick, supra note 226, at 30.
252. Id. at 22.
253. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 909.
254. ED Data Express, Total Federal Funding for Elementary and Secondary Education
Programs: FY 2012, ED.GOV, http://www.eddataexpress.ed.gov/data-element-explorer.cfm/
tab/data/deid/16 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
255. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2663 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Of this, more than $233 billion went to preexpansion Medicaid.”).
256. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
257. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 258 (6th Cir.
2009) (en banc).
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its federal Medicaid funds amount to 33% of its expenditures.258 Furthermore, although the federal government has been heavily involved in state
primary and secondary education over the past few decades, the states are
not significantly reliant on federal money. States receive considerably less
federal funding under NCLB than Medicaid and the funds they do receive
“are to be used only to implement Title I programming.” 259 Thus, the states
could probably not argue that their reliance on federal funds is heavy
enough to rise to a “significant” level under the plurality’s opinion.
Interestingly, there would be a much better chance that NCLB would
fail if the joint dissent’s opinion, rather than the plurality’s opinion, was
controlling in NFIB v. Sebelius. First, there are abundant similarities between NCLB and the joint dissent’s hypothetical. As the joint dissent concluded, Congress merely offering the states a large federal grant could be
considered coercive if a state’s failure to accept the grant would put its citizens in a position of compensating that program with a considerable amount
in federal taxes.260 Like the plurality opinion, however, the joint dissent did
not leave much indication as to how large a federal grant or federal tax burden would need to be in order to meet the significance element of coercion.
Despite this, unlike the plurality, if the joint dissent did find the tax burden
for rejecting the law significant, NCLB would be unconstitutional.
Second, the argument that the states could simply increase their own
tax revenues to compensate their loss in rejecting NCLB would not survive.
Prior to NFIB v. Sebelius, Allison Quick, a former Harvard Law School student, addressed this argument in a paper she wrote for a seminar class on
federal budget policy.261 She concluded that the funds at stake under ESEA’s
reauthorization into NCLB would not be significant enough to constitute
coercion.262 To support her argument, she relied on the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals case, California v. United States,263 which held that California
had a real choice in whether to remain a participant of the Medicaid program
even if opting out of it would bankrupt its state because “a sovereign state . .
. is always free to increase its tax revenues.”264 As is now known, Ms. Quick
and the Ninth Circuit’s argument would not hold up under the joint dissent’s
coercion analysis. Justice Ginsburg made the exact same point in NFIB v.

258. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
259. Pontiac, 584 F.3d at 258.
260. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
261. Howell E. Jackson, Briefing Papers on Federal Budget Policy, HARV. LAW SCH.
(Sept. 2008), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/budget.php.
262. Quick, supra note 226, at 44.
263. 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
264. Id. at 1092 (quoting Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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Sebelius, and the joint dissent shot it down because “heavy federal taxation
diminishes the [States’ ability] . . . to collect their own taxes.”265
Finally, the joint dissent might find further evidence of coercion, like it
did in NFIB v. Sebelius, based on Congress’s underlying intent with the
NCLB. Ms. Quick explained in her paper that after Congress passed NCLB
in 2002, “[i]n January 2004, the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the
Utah State Office of Education wrote a letter to the [U.S.] Secretary of Education asking for an opinion on the consequences of potential nonparticipation by the state in [NCLB].”266 The Department of Education (DOE) responded a month later explaining that Utah could opt out of NCLB if it
wished and still participate in separate discretionary grant programs, however, doing so would be “particularly detrimental.”267 For instance, the DOE
explained that “opting out of Title I . . . would . . . jeopardiz[e] funding for a
number of other programs because the funding formulas are linked.”268
Statements like these from the DOE would suggest that, like in NFIB v.
Sebelius, Congress wrote NCLB in such a way that it knew the states would
be unable to reject it. Thus, if the joint dissent’s opinion were controlling,
this further evidence would simply be icing on the cake for it to conclude
that Congress was coercing the states into accepting NCLB.
Nevertheless, as we know from NFIB v. Sebelius, the joint dissent’s
opinion did not carry the day. Based on the plurality opinion’s coercion
analysis and the figures above, it is unlikely that the threatened funding under NCLB would rise to a requisite level of significance and be considered
coercive. This is not to say the plurality’s holding in NFIB v. Sebelius did
not at least open the door for a state to challenge a law like NCLB. After all,
“[a]fter Medicaid, the next biggest federal funding item is aid to support
elementary and secondary education.”269 However, the gap between federal
funding for Medicaid and federal funding for primary and secondary education still remains large and, while the states might be able to at least make a
claim of coercion since NFIB v. Sebelius, they are still quite far off from
having a strong case. Notwithstanding the fact that it would be difficult for a
state to meet NFIB v. Sebelius’s significance element in challenging NCLB,
for a full coercion analysis under the plurality’s opinion, it is still necessary
to apply its independence element to NCLB.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 n.13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Quick, supra note 226, at 30.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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Independence

In order to not confuse the understanding of the independence element,
it is first necessary to start by applying the germaneness test. As previously
explained, South Dakota v. Dole’s270 germaneness test is different from the
independence element of coercion in NFIB v. Sebelius. 271 Rather than being
an element of coercion, the test, like coercion, is a separate limitation on
Congress’s spending clause power.272 To be germane, Congress’s “condition
must be related, or have a nexus, to the purpose of the appropriation.”273 As
Justice Sutton stated in his concurring opinion in Pontiac,
Surely there is a legitimate connection between the Act’s funding and the
conditions imposed on the States who accept it. Congress did not give
the States federal money for education, then insist that they move the location of their capitals or rename their state birds. Congress asked them
to meet a series of educational requirements in return for receiving education funding.274

In fact, Congress’s stated purpose with NCLB “was to increase the proficiency of students in underachieving school districts, while simultaneously
‘provid[ing] parents with options.’”275 Clearly there is a nexus between increasing the proficiency of students in underachieving school districts and
federal education funding, and, thus, NCLB meets the Dole germaneness
test. However, because this test is different from the independence element
discussed in NFIB v. Sebelius, a different analysis must be conducted to
examine that element.
When Congress amended ESEA to become NCLB, it created many
new conditions for states to receive Title I funding. One of the new conditions was that states submit accountability plans to the Secretary of Education.276 These plans require that states create and maintain Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) programs that are designed to improve student academic
proficiency rates.277 If a particular state’s school fails to meet the necessary
270. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
271. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.1.
272. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“Third, our cases have suggested (without significant
elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”).
273. W. Paul Koenig, Comment, Does Congress Abuse Its Spending Clause Power by
Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State’s Compliance with “Megan’s Law”?, 88 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 721, 746 (1998).
274. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 284 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring).
275. Caffrey, supra note 230, at 1131 (alteration in original).
276. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006).
277. Id. § 6316(b)(8).
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AYP measurements, that school would be required to take certain actions
such as replacing the school staff, instituting a new curriculum, and turning
the operation of the school over to the state educational agency.278 Another
new condition that Congress created under NCLB was that states prepare
and disseminate annual state report cards.279 These report cards must contain
information such as a comparison of student proficiency levels, the professional qualifications of teachers in the state, and trends in student achievement areas.280 Congress also required under NCLB that states in need of
school improvement establish support teams.281 These teams must be composed of knowledgeable individuals who can design and implement a plan
to help the schools meet yearly progress reports and evaluate school personnel.282
Given these extensive new conditions under NCLB, one might argue
the new conditions are so distinct that they are independent of the original
Title I funding, and Congress is using the old Title I funding as leverage for
the states’ acceptance of NCLB. Like the Medicaid expansion, many new
provisions were created under NCLB. Moreover, these new NCLB provisions are more distinct than former new provisions because they create a
significant amount of different and additional work for states that want to
receive Title I funding.283 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has stated that
NCLB is a “dramatic shift in federal educational policy.”284 Because states
cannot continue to receive Title I funding without accepting the new NCLB
conditions, one could argue that Congress is using future Title I funding as
leverage to force the states into accepting this new, independent NCLB program.
On the other hand, however, one could also argue that NCLB’s conditions are not independent because they are not distinct and separate enough
from the original ESEA conditions. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality did not
find the Medicaid expansion to be an independent program simply because
278. Id. See also Quick, supra note 226, at 28–29.
279. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(1), (h) (2006).
280. See id. § 6311(h)(1)(C). Aside from the required information that must be provided
in school report cards under § 6311(h)(1)(C), schools may provide other optional information
in their annual state report cards such as attendance rates, average class sizes, and the extent
of parent involvement as well. See id. § 6311(h)(1)(D).
281. Id. § 6317(a) (2006).
282. Id. § 6317(a)(5)(A).
283. A significant amount of this additional work involves school districts attempting to
meet the many unattainable achievement levels under NCLB. See Caffrey, supra note 224, at
1133–36. As a result of this different and additional work, many states have been put in the
position of trying to come up with additional money to fund NCLB. See id. at 1137–38. This
has been the result because the government significantly undershot how much Title I funding
would be necessary to allocate for the states that accepted NCLB. Id.
284. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 461 (2009).
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Congress added a new group of “needy individuals” to the original Medicaid
program.285 It was also the size of that new group, how that group would be
funded, and the difference in health insurance that group would receive that
caused the plurality to find the Medicaid expansion was an entirely separate
health insurance program.286 Perhaps if the Medicaid expansion had instead
required the original Medicaid program to encompass a much smaller group,
such as unemployed former law professors, rather than all people 133%
below the poverty line, the plurality would not have concluded that the expansion was “an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance.”287 Thus, one could argue that the NCLB’s changes
to ESEA are not similar enough to the Medicaid expansion’s changes to the
original Medicaid program to become independent. Furthermore, although
NCLB does add significant requirements for states to implement in order to
receive future Title I funding, even if Congress allocates more funding for
those requirements, they will all still be paid for under the banner of Title I
funding.288 Thus, unlike the Medicaid expansion, NCLB conditions restrict
how Title I funding is to be used.289 Therefore, one could just as easily argue
that the new NCLB conditions are not so distinct from the original conditions under ESEA that they amount to an independent program on their own.
Despite these two competing arguments, the structure of NCLB might
actually cause the law to survive the independence inquiry altogether. Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos persuasively argues that reauthorization of a
law matters when analyzing the plurality’s two-part coercion test in NFIB v.

285. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–09 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
286. Id. at 2606.
287. Id.
288. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6302 (2006).
289. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (using South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) as an analogy to
show that the Medicaid expansion does not govern how original Medicaid funds are used),
and Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918–19 (explaining that the plurality found independence
occurs when the new conditions do not govern how the threatened funding is to be used),
with Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 258–59 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (“[T]he funds distributed under Title I are to be used only to implement Title
I programming, not to replace funds already being used for general programming.”), and 20
U.S.C. § 6302 (2006) (listing the numerous appropriations for each fiscal year and their respective subsections that each amount of funds will go towards). Unlike NCLB, which governs how schools are to use their threatened Title I funds, the threatened Medicaid funds in
NFIB v. Sebelius were contingent upon states accepting and using entirely different federal
money to create a less comprehensive Medicaid benefit package for new Medicaid expansion
recipients. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
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Sebelius.290 Under its spending power, Congress must “ensure[] that funds
are spen[t] according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’”291 Citing former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Professor Bagenstos explains that Congress’s understanding of the general welfare is constantly
changing.292 This constant change can be caused by a number of reasons
such as political party differences and unforeseen consequences of a law. As
history has shown, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats alone have
consistently controlled our branches of government. If citizens are unhappy
with their politicians or a certain political party, they can act on their feelings through our democratic voting process. Sometimes a citizen’s issue will
not be with either political party but instead with a particular law. In that
case, the citizen could relay any concerns about the law to his or her federal
representatives, and those representatives could then amend the law accordingly. These examples are just a few of the ways that show why the Supreme Court has never viewed Congress’s understanding of the general welfare as static, and Professor Bagenstos explains that this view did not change
after NFIB v. Sebelius.293
Given the precedence of this longstanding view of the general welfare,
the plurality seemed to acknowledge that Congress could have constitutionally repealed the old Medicaid program and then enacted an entirely new
program that contained both old Medicaid and Medicaid expansion conditions.294 This procedure of repealing and replacing a law can be seen as a
290. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 870–71, 910 (implying that reauthorization does not
involve the type of cross-program leveraging that occurred with the Medicaid expansion in
NFIB v. Sebelius).
291. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
292. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885–87.
293. See id.
294. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 n.14; see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885. Professor Bagenstos points out, however, that Chief Justice Roberts noted that repealing and
replacing the Medicaid law would “not be that easy.” Id. Professor Bagenstos admits it is
hard to decipher exactly what the Chief Justice was implying with this statement. Id. It is
certainly true that regardless of the possible political difficulties with repealing and replacing
Medicaid, the Chief Justice would require Congress to go through that process rather than
engage in coercion through its use of the Medicaid expansion. After all, even if the result
would be the same, these are the types of checks and balances on federal power that our
government is designed to have. Even so, however, given the phraseology of the opinion, it
remains questionable how sympathetic the Chief Justice would really be to a repealed and
replaced version of Medicaid. E-mail from Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, UALR
William H. Bowen School of Law, to Ellen K. Howard, Law Student, UALR William H.
Bowen School of Law (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:45 PM) (on file with author). Chief Justice Roberts’s statement is also worth questioning because of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Id. Although this doctrine focuses on the relationship between individuals and the government, it would be unsurprising to see the Court apply the doctrine to federalism and enumerated powers disputes between the federal government and a state. Id. But see Pace v. Bo-
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close parallel to reauthorization of a law—particularly, a law such as
NCLB.295 Professor Bagenstos explains that at the core of the plurality’s
independence element is this idea of “cross-program leveraging.”296 With
cross-program leveraging, there are two programs in play and Congress is
using the funds of one of the programs as leverage for the other.297 Professor
Bagenstos explains that cross-program leveraging cannot occur when Congress repeals and replaces a law or reauthorizes a law because, in each instance, there is only one law being created, and that law alone is on a take-itor-leave-it basis.298 Furthermore, reauthorization may also be somewhat
different because a key feature of the process is a program’s inevitable termination if Congress does nothing.299
Neither reauthorization feature applied to the Medicaid expansion in
NFIB v. Sebelius. In NFIB v. Sebelius, two programs were at issue, an old
Medicaid program and new Medicaid expansion program, and the former
was being used as leverage for the latter.300 Congress, however, did not use
this same technique with ESEA’s Title I funding and NCLB.301 By reauthorizing ESEA into NCLB, Congress was not leveraging the states’ future Title
I funding under the old ESEA program upon their acceptance of a new
NCLB program.302 Rather, because of the process of reauthorization, NCLB
itself would now be the law, and the states that wanted to continue receiving
galusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 286–287 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Supreme
Court has never applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a dispute between sovereigns; further concluding that, in the spending context, the doctrine is “subsumed” by the
coercion element of Dole). For further explanation of this doctrine, see infra text accompanying note 409. At some point, the line starts to break down between repealing a program and
starting over, and cross leveraging one program with another. See E-mail from Joshua M.
Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra. Perhaps it would also be the case that the Chief Justice
was simply throwing his statement about the difficulty out there and implying that he would
discuss the constitutional implications of repealing and replacing Medicaid, but there is no
need because the likelihood of Congress repealing and replacing Medicaid is slim-to-none.
Because it is uncertain what exactly the Chief Justice meant with this statement, for the sake
of argument, probably the best we can do is take the statement at its face value—Congress
can still constitutionally repeal and enact an entirely new Medicaid law.
295. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 885, 909–10 (“As I argued in Part II.B. . . . .”).
296. See id. at 870–71.
297. Id.
298. Compare id. (“Congress did not merely change the terms of the ongoing Medicaid
program but . . . it allowed states to remain in that program only if they would agree also to
participate in . . . a separate and independent program.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 910
(“[U]nder that proposal there would effectively be no Title I program . . . .”).
299. See E-mail from Professor Joshua M. Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra note
294.
300. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 891–92.
301. See id. at 910–11.
302. See id. at 910 (“NCLB itself—laws in which Congress decided that it would no
longer fund preexisting programs unless they assumed a fundamentally different form.”).
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Title I funding could take it or leave it.303 Furthermore, if Congress never
reauthorized ESEA into NCLB, and simply did nothing, there would be no
Title I funding for the states to receive in the future anyway. 304 Title I funding would essentially end without reauthorization.305
Because there is no cross-program leveraging occurring with NCLB, it
is irrelevant whether the ESEA assumed a fundamentally different form
under NCLB.306 When Congress reauthorized ESEA into NCLB, Congress
was simply “governing the use of funds” according to its current understanding of the general welfare.307 Professor Bagenstos argues that this reading of NFIB v. Sebelius must necessarily follow because otherwise “Congress’s authority to tailor spending to its current understanding of what
serves the general welfare [would be undercut]—an authority that Chief
Justice Roberts expressly endorsed.”308
3.

Conclusion

NCLB is overdue for reauthorization again, and many of Congress’s
new proposals for the act could impose major new requirements on states.309
Before the 2012 Presidential Election, Governor Mitt Romney, the 2012
Republican presidential candidate, had a long list of new conditions for Title
I of NCLB that he wanted to require of states if he were elected.310 Some of
these conditions included “portable” vouchers, open-enrollment policies,
and online schooling—all of which would be required for states to accept if
they wished to continue receiving federal education funds.311 If the current
Congress has anything like Governor Romney’s proposals in mind when it
comes time to reauthorize NCLB, while a state would now at least have a
coercion argument under NFIB v. Sebelius, given the analysis above it is
unlikely that a state would win. The better conclusion under the plurality’s
analysis is that a court would find that a reauthorization of NCLB—even
with major changes—does not constitute coercion. A court would probably
303. See id.
304. See E-mail from Professor Joshua M. Silverstein to Ellen K. Howard, supra note
294.
305. In fact, funding under NCLB expired in 2007, and President Barack Obama and
Congress have been discussing measures to take to reauthorize the law ever since then. Joy
Resmovits, No Child Left Behind Vote in House Passes Substitute, Shifting Away from Bush’s
POST
(July
19,
2012,
11:22
AM),
Education
Vision,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/no-child-left-behind-vote_n_3623100.html.
306. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 892.
307. Id. at 910.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 907.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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find this way because ESEA’s reauthorization into NCLB would not meet
the independence element, and federal education funding does not rise to the
requisite level of significance under NFIB v. Sebelius.
If the states really want out of NCLB today, their better option, and one
that many—including Arkansas—are currently exercising, is to seek waivers
of the law.312 In fact, the Obama Administration has been very lenient in
granting waivers to states that want to be released from NCLB313—so long
as those states agree, in exchange for those waivers, to accept his administration’s education policies, which some argue has legal issues of its
own.314 Nevertheless, considering all of the extreme and imminent financial
penalties that many states face due to their failure to meet NCLB standards,
the waivers may still be the better option rather than waiting around to challenge Congress on its next reauthorization of NCLB.
B.

The Clean Air Act

Another law that could face legal challenges after NFIB v. Sebelius is
The Clean Air Act (CAA).315 The CAA requires that each state submit a
State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) within three years after the promulgation of primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).316
These SIPs must meet the minimum requirements of the primary and secondary NAAQS317 and must include items such as enforceable emission
limitations, schedules and timetables for compliance, and provisions that
provide for the establishment and operation of appropriate systems that
monitor ambient air quality data.318 If any state fails to submit a SIP, submits
an inadequate SIP, or is not implementing a requirement of its SIP, the Administrator is required to impose sanctions on that state.319 The Administrator may impose sanctions that deny the noncomplying state any projects or
312. Education Week, NCLB Waivers: A State-by-State Breakdown, VISUALIZING.ORG
(Nov.
8,
2011),
http://www.visualizing.org/visualizations/nclb-waivers-state-statebreakdown.
313. Motoko Rich, ‘No Child’ Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/education/no-child-leftbehind-whittled-down-under-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
314. See Lindsey Burke, No Child Left Behind Waivers: Bogus Relief, Genuine OverHERITAGE
FOUND.
(Sept.
5,
2012),
reach,
THE
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/no-child-left-behind-waivers-bogus-reliefgenuine-overreach.
315. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
316. Id. § 7410(a)(1) (2006); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 917.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1)(A)–(B); id. § 7511 (2006).
318. See id. § 7410(a)(2).
319. See id. § 7509(a) (2006).
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highway grants that the Secretary of Transportation has awarded to it for its
“nonattainment areas.”320 Nonattainment areas are areas that do not meet the
primary or secondary NAAQS and also include stationary sources.321 The
Administrator, however, is barred from denying the noncomplying state any
federal highway grants or projects that have the principal purpose of improving highway safety.322 The Administrator is also barred from denying
the noncomplying state certain federal grants or projects that help reduce
emissions.323 Some of these exclusions include capital programs for public
transit, construction of roads for the use of high occupancy vehicles, and
programs that improve traffic flow.324 There are also times when these SIPs
have the possibility of being suspended for emergency situations.325 If any
state’s governor petitions the President of the United States to temporarily
suspend any part of a SIP based on a national or regional energy emergency,
the President has the discretion to allow that temporary suspension.326 Except for the few safety and energy exceptions, and severe emergency situations, the Administrator may revoke the noncomplying state’s federal highway projects or funding until he or she “determines that the state has come
into compliance.”327
Congress’s tailoring of the CAA would certainly prompt a coercion
analysis because Congress is threatening to take away a state’s federal
highway funding if that state does not implement Congress’s condition of
NAAQS. Thus, in applying the plurality’s coercion test to the CAA, it is
necessary to determine the significance of the highway funds that the Administrator could revoke and the independence of the condition (the
NAAQS) from the highway funding.
1.

Significance

While the plurality did not specify exactly how significant a federal
grant would need to be to constitute coercion, it did leave a number of clues
as to how future courts might determine this element. For example, one of
the reasons the plurality found the original Medicaid funds significant was
because Congress threatened to revoke the entire grant.328 The CAA differs
320. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(A).
321. See id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“any area”).
322. Id. § 7509(b)(1).
323. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B).
324. Id. For the full list, see id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(i)–(viii).
325. Id. § 7410(f) (2006).
326. Id.
327. See id. § 7509(a)(4)–(b)(1).
328. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.)
(plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
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in this respect because the Administrator is barred from revoking all of a
state’s federal highway funds.329 There are certain grants and projects that
promote highway safety and emission reduction that the Administrator is not
allowed to touch when he or she is imposing sanctions on a noncomplying
state.330
There were two additional reasons that the original Medicaid grant at
stake was significant enough to constitute coercion: (1) The amount an average state devoted to its overall budget in Medicaid spending, and (2) the
amount the federal government contributed to that spending.331 Based on
these two reasons, there is a very low possibility that a court would ever find
that the federal highway funds at stake under the CAA rise to a level of
“significance.” Medicaid spending accounts for more than 20% of the average state’s overall budget.332 This is almost triple the average state budget’s
transportation spending, which amounted to only 7.4% in fiscal year 2011.333
Moreover, out of that 7.4%, only 32.1% of it is covered by federal funds,334
which is less than a third of the average state’s transportation spending.335
This is significantly less than the 50% to 83% of funds that the federal government contributes to the average state budget’s 20% in Medicaid spending336 and amounts to nearly two-thirds of the average state’s overall Medicaid spending.337
The federal highway funds that a state stands to lose under the CAA
become even more insignificant when it is also taken into consideration that
Administrator would probably not revoke the full 32.1% of federal funds. At
least some of those funds would probably be designated for safety or emission reduction, which the Administrator is denied power over.338 In contrast,
if a state rejected the Medicaid expansion and, thus, lost all of its federal
Medicaid funds, it could potentially lose over ten percent of its entire state

329. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (“The Administrator may impose a prohibition . . . other
than projects or grants for safety . . . . [i]n addition to safety . . . .”).
330. Id.
331. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.); see also supra Part II.A.2.
332. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
333. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING
FISCAL
2010-2012
62
(2012),
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/State%20Expenditure%20Report_1.pdf.
334. Id.
335. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 919.
336. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
337. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 919.
338. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (2006).
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budget.339 To further contrast this point, in Dole, South Dakota’s potential
loss of less than half of one percent of its overall state budget was not significant enough to constitute coercion.340 Needless to say, if the federal highway funds at stake under the CAA were placed on a significance balancing
scale—Dole being the insignificant side and NFIB v. Sebelius being the significant side—they would more likely lean towards Dole.
A final reason that the plurality found the size of the original federal
Medicaid grant significant was because of the states’ reliance on that entrenched federal grant.341 The states had, for many years now, used their
federal Medicaid funds to develop intricate statutory and administrative
schemes, and if those funds were terminated, their efforts would become
futile.342 Professor Jonathan Adler notes that states are heavily reliant on
federal funds in their transportation budgets.343 Professor Adler explains that
“[h]ighway funds are raised from a dedicated revenue source in gasoline
taxes and placed in the Highway Trust Fund[,]” which for many states, “represent[s] the lion’s share of their transportation budget.”344 He argues that
“[a]s a consequence, threatening to take highway funds may strike some
courts as unduly coercive under [NFIB v. Sebelius].”345 However, even if the
states are heavily reliant on these federal highway grants, their reliance is
probably still not enough to constitute “significance.” The plurality seems to
be much more likely to find the significance element met if the states were
not just heavily reliant, but heavily reliant on a large federal grant. In other
words, the larger the threatened federal grant, the more likely coercion is
present. In the fiscal year of 2011, only 32.1% of state expenditures for
transportation came from federal funding,346 which is significantly lower
than the 50% to 83% of federal funds that went to state Medicaid expenditures.347 Moreover, the average state spends only 7.4% of its budget on
transportation,348 which is well below the 20% spent on Medicaid.349 While
339. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
340. Id. at 2604–05.
341. See id. at 2604.
342. See id.
343. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 917.
344. Jonathan Adler, Could the Health Care Decision Hobble the Clean Air Act?, THE
PROP. & ENV’T RESEARCH BLOG, http://perc.org/blog/could-health-care-decision-hobbleclean-air-act (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
345. Id.
346. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 333, at 62.
347. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
348. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 333, at 62.
349. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
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there is definitely a real argument to be made that the amount of federal
highway funds that could be terminated under the CAA is significant
enough to constitute coercion, the stronger argument is that the threat to
revoke those funds would only constitute “mild encouragement.”350 For purposes of this coercion analysis, however, it is still necessary to analyze the
independence element from the plurality’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius.
2.

Independence

Again, it is helpful to start this section with an application of the germaneness test in order not to confuse the understanding of independence. A
condition can be germane to one of the purposes of the threatened federal
funding while at the same time be completely independent from that funding.351 In Dole, Congress’s condition that called “upon states to raise [their]
drinking age[s]” was germane because it “echoed the explicit purposes of
the federal highway programs—safe highways[;]”352 and in NFIB v.
Sebelius, the Medicaid expansion met the germaneness test because it was
related to the purpose of the original Medicaid program—providing
healthcare to the nation’s poor.353 The CAA’s requirement that states submit
SIPs that comply with NAAQS would meet the germaneness test “because
both automobiles and stationary sources contribute to ‘the overall problem
of air pollution.’”354
At the same time, however, the CAA conditions could also be independent from the threatened federal highway grants. If the states choose to
challenge the CAA’s condition in the lower court systems, the courts could
find that, like the Medicaid expansion, the CAA’s SIP requirements are independent of the threatened grant. The states would need to argue that Congress is continuing to fund essentially the same highway program, under
essentially the same rules as it did before, but now it is requiring that if
states wish to continue that program, they must agree to implement the
CAA’s new and separate SIP program.355 This argument would probably
succeed. Like the conditions in Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius, the condition
under the CAA is not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be
350. See id. at 2604 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
351. See discussion supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.1.
352. Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 450 (2005).
353. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (joined by Sotomayor, J.).
354. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 917–18 (quoting Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 882
(4th Cir. 1996)). In fact, some lower courts have expressly said that the CAA meets the germaneness test. Id.
355. See id. at 910.
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used.356 In Dole, for example, the threatened federal highway funds were
used for improving and maintaining specific highways, and Congress’s requirement that the states raise their drinking ages had nothing to do with that
use.357 Similarly, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the plurality concluded that the independence element was met because rather than governing the use of the
original Medicaid funding, Congress threatened to terminate that funding if
the states did not accept a new program that came with new recipients, new
funding, and new coverage plans.358 The plurality found that this represented
such significant growth in the original Medicaid program that the expansion
was, in reality, a completely different program. 359
Although the CAA’s condition of requiring states to submit SIPs does
not exactly mirror the Medicaid expansion, those requirements, at least for
stationary sources of pollution, “do not govern how states should construct
and maintain highways.”360 Additionally, Professor Bagenstos explains that
those requirements also do not “govern the use of the highways constructed
or maintained with federal funds[,]” or even “which highways to construct
and maintain.”361 To illustrate, suppose the Secretary of Transportation allotted highway funding for states to repaint their highway ramps. Under the
CAA, because this is not one of the specified safety or emission reduction
projects, the Administrator would have free reign in his or her decision to
revoke it. If a state’s SIP failed to meet the required NAAQS because of
some stationary source of pollution, like a bakery, the Administrator would
be allowed to revoke that state’s project to repaint its highway ramps 362
when that bakery’s emissions had nothing to do with the funding for that
project—they were completely independent of each other.363 Similarly, in
NFIB v. Sebelius, if a state chose to decline the Medicaid expansion, it
would have lost all of its original Medicaid funding when that expansion
had nothing to do with the original funding in the first place.364 Under the
plurality opinion, neither one of these scenarios would be acceptable because they each involve Congress using funding from one program as leverage for states to accept an independent program, which constitutes coercion

356. Id. at 918–19; see also supra Part II.A.3.
357. See Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918–19.
358. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
359. Id.
360. Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 918 (emphasis added).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 917 (illustrating this distinction with Professor Jonathan Adler’s analogy).
363. See Adler, supra note 352, at 451.
364. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.) (explaining that the Medicaid expansion creates a completely independent program).
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when coupled with significance.365 Therefore, due to these important similarities between the Medicaid expansion and the CAA’s condition, and their
relation to federal funding, a state that challenges the CAA’s condition
would have a strong argument that the condition is independent of its federal
highway funding.
3.

Conclusion

It is likely that the CAA’s condition would meet the independence element of plurality’s coercion test but fail its significance element. It remains
unclear how exactly courts will interpret the plurality’s opinion, or whether
it would even apply to the CAA at all. Professor Bagenstos argues that the
plurality meant it when it said that for coercion to be present, both elements
of the coercion test in NFIB v. Sebelius must be met.366 Specifically,
“[c]oercion is present only when the new condition ties continued participation in an entrenched and lucrative funding program to a state’s agreement
also to participate in a separate and independent program.”367 Under his interpretation, Congress’s condition under the CAA should still likely survive
because, while the highway funds are independent from the condition, there
is far less money and reliance at stake to meet the significance element under NFIB v. Sebelius.368 Because the amount of funds being threatened under
the CAA simply does not rise to the requisite level of significance described
in NFIB v. Sebelius, the states would be able to reject the CAA’s condition
not just in theory, but also in fact.
However, Professor Bagenstos declined to find, even under his interpretation of NFIB v. Sebelius, that a case against the CAA would be a slamdunk for the federal government: “[b]ecause it is unclear at exactly what
point a state should be understood to lack a real choice to refuse a federal
grant, it is impossible to predict precisely how courts will apply NFIB to the
CAA.”369 Rather, he concluded that when NFIB v. Sebelius is applied to
laws like the CAA, the states will have stronger bargaining power:
[I]f the Administrator were to shut off all federal highway funds to a
state based on the state’s failure to provide a sufficient response to stationary sources of pollution, her actions would raise serious questions
under the Chief Justice’s opinion. That is not to say that those actions

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See id. at 2605–06.
Bagenstos, supra note 10, 909–10.
Id. at 910.
See id. at 919–20.
Id. at 920.

2013]

SPENDING CLAUSE RULING

653

would be unconstitutional. . . . But . . . the federal executive may not
want to take the chance that courts will disagree.370

Another interpretation that could develop from the plurality’s coercion
test is the application of principles from the doctrine of unconscionability.371
For the doctrine to apply, both procedural and substantive unconscionability
must be present.372 Unlike typical element structures used throughout the
common law, however, there is a sliding scale with the two
unconscionability elements.373 This means that the more one element of
unconscionability is present, the less we need of other.374 If this type of
structure operates in the spending clause context, then the more a court finds
a spending condition independent of the original spending program that
Congress claims it modifies, the less necessary it will be for that court to
find the threatened funds significant. Of course, the same would be true if
the outcome of the elements was reversed in that situation. Applying these
principles to the plurality’s holding and to the CAA’s condition might
strengthen the states’ argument. Although there might be only a small
amount of significance present, because the level of independence is so
great, the states would have a stronger argument that the CAA’s conditions
are coercive and thus, an unconstitutional use of Congress’s spending power.
Despite all of this, some law professors have argued that the NFIB v.
Sebelius holding would not even apply to the CAA because the Medicaid
expansion and the CAA are too distinct. Professor Jonathan Zasloff argues
that the CAA and the Medicaid expansion in NFIB v. Sebelius are distinct
from each other because Medicaid is an entitlement program in which federal funds flow automatically, and federal highway spending requires Con-

370. Id.
371. See Interview with Joshua M. Silverstein, Professor of Law, UALR William H.
Bowen School of Law, in Little Rock, Ark. (Nov. 12, 2012). My thanks to Professor Joshua
Silverstein of UALR William H. Bowen School of Law for helping me develop this argument.
372. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (2008); see also Arthur Allen
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485,
487–88 (1967) (discussing the necessity of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
373. E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (both elements of unconscionability required under the sliding scale). Not all
courts apply the sliding scale to unconscionability, however. See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58–59 (Ariz. 1995) (agreeing with jurisdictions that accept either procedural or substantive unconscionability alone).
374. Dean Witter Reynolds, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
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gress to appropriate money annually.375 States have relied on federal Medicaid grants for decades, so Congress’s threat to revoke that funding seems
much more coercive than a threat to revoke federal highway funds in which
states have less of an expectation.376 According to Professor Zasloff, the
states are accustomed to Congress apportioning federal highway funds to
them every year and “always are on the alert”—this is not the case for Medicaid.377 While Professor Zasloff even questions himself as to whether “this
[is] a distinction without a difference,” he notes that there is at least precedent for his distinction.378 He used the case of Goldberg v. Kelly379 to explain
the distinction:
[The Supreme Court] held that AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent
Children] benefits constituted “property” within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause, and thus an AFDC recipient had a right to a hearing before they were cut off. Central to Goldberg was the notion that AFDC
was an entitlement, and thus it generated reasonable expectations under
recipients.380

Although he admits that “Goldberg’s notion of an entitlement is somewhat different than [NFIB v. Sebelius’s], . . . it is not really that different
than the normal sort of analogical reasoning traditional[ly] used by courts[,]
[and] [m]oreover, the terseness of the Chief Justice’s opinion pretty much
requires this.”381
While it is unclear how exactly future courts will interpret the plurality’s coercion test for the CAA, or whether NFIB v. Sebelius would even be
applicable to the CAA, one thing is certain: NFIB v. Sebelius has opened up
the possibility that a state challenging the CAA’s conditions will have a
fighting chance in the federal court systems.
C.

“Megan’s Law”

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an outbreak of violent sexual crimes against children.382 The media reported one child after another
who were kidnapped, violently raped, and then brutally murdered by previ-

375. Jonathan Zasloff, Conditional Spending and the Clean Air Act, LEGAL P LANET (June
28, 2012), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2012/06/28/conditional-spending-and-the-cleanair-act/.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
380. Zasloff, supra note 375 (emphasis added).
381. Id.
382. Koenig, supra note 273, at 723–24.
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ously convicted child sex offenders.383 This sparked outrage by the parents
of the victims and the rest of the American public.384 They asserted that “if
they had known the danger posed by their previously convicted [sex offender] neighbors, they [might] have been able to protect [the] children.”385 This
prompted the politicians in Washington to respond by enacting law enforcement laws, which is an area that is traditionally left up to state regulation.386 One of the first laws that emerged from the public’s outcry was
“Megan’s Law.”387 This law was named after Megan Kanka, a seven-yearold girl, who was one of the highly publicized victims of this sexual predator epidemic in the late 80s and 90s.388
Under Megan’s Law, Congress provides states with the incentive to
“implement a system where all persons who commit sexual or kidnapping
crimes against children or who commit sexually violent crimes against any
person (whether adult or child) are required to register their address with the
state upon their release from prison.”389 If a state chooses to implement Megan’s Law, “immediately after a sex offender registers or updates [his or
her] registration [information], an appropriate [state] official . . . [is then
required to] provide the [offender’s registry] information . . . to” a number
of different agencies.390 Some of which include school and public housing
agencies; social service agencies responsible for protecting minors in the
child welfare system; and volunteer organizations that have contact with
minors and other vulnerable individuals.391 If a state that agreed to this condition fails to provide the sex offender’s information to the appropriate
agencies, it faces losing ten percent of its annual funds from the Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG).392 States use this

383. See id.
384. See id. at 724.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 729. The first of these laws was the “Wetterling Act,” which was enacted
“as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.” Id. at 728. The
Wetterling Act was named after Jacob Wetterling who was abducted in 1989 near his home
in Minnesota—both his and his perpetrators whereabouts remain unknown to date. Id. at 727.
Congress later found the Wetterling Act’s language to be too weak. See id. at 729. This
prompted Congress to amend the act to include stronger language that required the states’
local law enforcement agencies to release relevant information about sex offenders. Id. Congress, also at that time, changed the name of the act to “Megan’s Law.” Id.
388. See Koenig, supra note 273, at 721–24.
389. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
390. 42 U.S.C. § 16921(b) (2006). For a list of those agencies, see id. § 16921(b)(1)–(7).
391. Id. § 16921(b)(1)–(7).
392. Id. § 16925(a) (2006); see also id. § 3750 (2006).
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funding for necessities such as law enforcement programs, prosecution and
court programs, prevention and education programs, etc.393
Like NCLB and the CAA, Megan’s Law would at least prompt a coercion analysis because Congress is threatening to take away a state’s law
enforcement funding if it does not implement the law’s condition of supplying sex predator information to certain agencies. Thus, in order to discover
whether Megan’s Law would survive the plurality’s coercion test, it is necessary to determine the significance of JAG and the independence of Megan’s Law from that grant.
1.

Significance

JAG is said to provide “the leading source of federal justice funding to
state, tribal, and local jurisdictions.”394 The vast majority of the grant goes
toward state law enforcement funding.395 In fact, sixty-two percent of JAG
from the fiscal years of 2009-2011 went solely to funding state law enforcement programs.396 The size of the JAG grant differs from year to
year.397 Congress bases the amount of the JAG grant for each fiscal year on
an eligibility formula that takes into account the individual population of
each state and the total population of the United States.398 In addition to
populations, the formula requires that the average annual number of violent
crimes for each state individually, and also collectively as a whole, be calculated to determine JAG funding.399 Based on this formula, Congress allocated over $423 million for the JAG grant in 2009.400 In 2010, it allocated over
$349 million, and in 2011, over $225 million, totaling over $998 million in
the past three fiscal years.401
Although within the fiscal years of 2009-2011 Congress allocated almost a billion dollars in JAG grants to the states, that amount does not hold
a candle to federal Medicaid funding. In the fiscal year of 2010 alone, Con-

393. Id. § 3751(a)(1) (2006).
394. See CSR, INC., JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM CLOSEOUT REPORT—
2010–MARCH
2012,
at
2
(Dec.
6,
2012),
available
at
JANUARY
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAG0312CloseoutReport.pdf.
395. See id. at 2–5.
396. Id. at 4.
397. See 42 U.S.C. § 3755(a)(1) (2006); see also Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_
ID=59 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
398. See 42 U.S.C. § 3755 (a)(1); BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 397.
399. 42 U.S.C. § 3755(a)(1)(B); see also BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE , supra note 397.
400. CSR, INC., supra note 394, at 4.
401. Id.
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gress allocated more than $233 billion to the original Medicaid program.402
Thus, what the states received in pre-expansion Medicaid funding in one
year is almost twenty-three times the amount they received from the JAG
grant in three years. Moreover, “[t]he Federal Government estimates that it
will pay out approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to
cover the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid.”403 Clearly, based on the eligibility formula, Congress would never come close to paying that amount in JAG
funding.
Furthermore, unlike with the Medicaid expansion, under Megan’s Law,
the states that fail to provide sex offenders’ information to the specified
agencies do not stand to lose all of their JAG funds. Rather, all a state stands
to lose is ten percent of whatever amount it received from that grant for that
year.404 A ten percent loss of state JAG funding is closer in amount to what
South Dakota stood to lose in Dole than what an average state stood to lose
in NFIB v. Sebelius. The average state that rejected the Medicaid expansion
in NFIB v. Sebelius stood to lose over ten percent of its entire state budget.405 This loss was much more significant than South Dakota’s potential loss
of less than half of one percent of its total state budget in Dole.406 Based on
Congress’s formula and the amount of funding it allocates for JAG each
year, it is much more likely that the average state’s budget loss would be
closer to South Dakota’s, and thus, pales in comparison to the funding that
was at stake in NFIB v. Sebelius. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that a
court would find the JAG grant under Megan’s Law significant enough to
constitute coercion. If the size of the grant was the only coercion element in
NFIB v. Sebelius, it would not even be necessary to consider independence
because the states would still have a real choice in whether or not to follow
the requirements under Megan’s Law.
Interestingly enough, however, back in 1998, attorney Paul Koenig
wrote an article about Congress’s spending clause power and its connection
to Megan’s Law.407 This article grappled with many of the same arguments
identified in NFIB v. Sebelius. At that time, although Mr. Koenig came to
the ultimate conclusion that Megan’s Law was a constitutional use of Congress’s spending power,408 he was skeptical of both this conclusion and the

402. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2663 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
403. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
404. 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2006).
405. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
406. Id. at 2604–05.
407. See generally Koenig, supra note 273.
408. Id. at 764–65.
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Supreme Court’s holding in Dole.409 At one point in the article, Mr. Koenig
appeared to be channeling the plurality’s coercion analysis in NFIB v.
Sebelius:
At least in theory, states can choose to refuse to release [a sex offender’s]
information and forego the federal funds. . . . However, this distinction
becomes less clear if the enticement of federal funds becomes so strong
that it presents the states with no realistic choice. If the states are sufficiently dependent on the federal funds, it may not matter that they have
choice in theory. In reality, the “enticement” in Megan’s Law may leave
the states with as little choice as the federal coercion in Printz. This
would occur if the states were so reliant on the federal funds that they
felt compelled to adhere to whatever terms the federal government included in its conditions.410

Of course, as already demonstrated, because the size of the JAG grant
is not even in the same ballpark as the size of the federal Medicaid grant, it
is highly unlikely that states could demonstrate enough reliance for courts to
find the threat of losing the JAG grant significant. It is not just the reliance
itself that seemed to matter to the plurality. Rather, it was a state’s reliance
409. See id. at 749–50. Mr. Koenig seemed to be skeptical of the constitutionality of
Megan’s Law primarily because he disagreed with the Court’s ruling in Dole. One reason he
took issue with the holding in Dole is because of the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions.” Id. at 750. Under this doctrine, the government is barred from conditioning a person’s
receipt of a governmental benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally protected right. Id. For
example, under this doctrine, the government would be disallowed from conditioning a person’s receipt of social security benefits on his or her promise to only practice Catholicism.
See id. Mr. Koenig explains that the Court in Dole “tried to circumvent this [doctrine] by
attempting to distinguish between conditional grants which are incentives and grants which
are ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’’” Id. at 751
(quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)). Professor Richard Epstein would
agree with Mr. Koenig’s argument. See Epstein, supra note 86. Professor Epstein, critiquing
the spending clause issue in NFIB v. Sebelius, explained that the “line [is] in the wrong place
when it says that small threats should be treated like inducements[;] . . . it makes no sense to
say that the robber who wants only 5 percent of your money for car fare has not coerced
you.” Id. Like Professor Epstein, Mr. Koenig believes that “degree of the conditional expenditure[] . . . should be irrelevant.” Compare Epstein, supra note 86, with Koenig, supra
note 273, at 751. Rather, he explains that what matters is whether “the condition on the grant
is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional regulation.” Koenig, supra note 273, at 751.
According to Mr. Koenig, because Congress is barred under the constitution from directly
regulating state laws that pertain to matters such as drinking age and law enforcement, Congress should not be able to regulate them indirectly by “us[ing] its purse strings.” Id. at 754.
However, the Court in Dole clearly did not follow this logic. Thus, Mr. Koenig explains that
because of the Court’s ruling in Dole, the idea that the federal government is limited to enumerated powers is extremely diminished. Id. Nevertheless, although he takes issue with
Dole’s holding, the holding still leads to the ultimate conclusion that Megan’s Law remains
constitutional. Id. at 764–65.
410. Koenig, supra note 273, at 742–43 (emphasis added).
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on a program that is so large in size that was important.411 Thus, states
would have a difficult time demonstrating that they were so heavily reliant
on a grant that is so small in size.
In addition to the plurality’s coercion analysis, Mr. Koenig, along with
other legal scholars, channeled the joint dissent’s coercion analysis as well:
Scholars have argued that the states often do not have a realistic choice
other than to accept the federal government’s condition upon the receipt
of funds. This lack of real choice occurs because the federal government
has become richer in relation to the states; the federal tax burden has
steadily increased over the last several decades. This heightened federal
burden makes it more difficult for the states to raise local taxes because
their constituents have less after-federal-tax income then [sic] in the past.
Therefore, the increased federal income tax in relation to the states has
resulted in the states being put in a position of greater dependence on
federal funds.412

Although we know that the joint dissenters lost in the battle of the coercion tests, even if they had won, Megan’s Law would probably still not be
significant enough to amount to coercion. The joint dissent’s hypothetical
dealt with education funding.413 While federal education funding for the
states amounts to far less than federal Medicaid funding, it is still significantly more than the JAG grant. In the fiscal year of 2011 alone, the government allocated over $35 billion to the states for elementary and secondary education programs.414 This amount of money makes the JAG grant’s
less than half a billion dollars over the course of three years look like
chump-change. This is not to diminish the importance that the states or the
federal government place on our law enforcement in this country, but is
merely to exhibit that the difference in amount of federal funds is important
in determining whether a state is being coerced into doing the federal governments bidding; and, even based on the joint dissent’s analysis, it appears
Megan’s Law would survive. Despite all of this, it is still necessary to do a
full coercion analysis using the plurality’s coercion test. Thus, Megan’s Law
must be analyzed under the test’s independence element.
2.

Independence

In Mr. Koenig’s 1998 article, he concluded that one of the reasons Megan’s Law was constitutional was because it met the “germaneness” or “re411. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
412. Koenig, supra note 273, at 749–50.
413. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
414. ED Data Express, supra note 254.
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latedness” test in Dole.415 Again, while the germaneness test is different
from the independence element of coercion, it is still necessary to mention
because it is required for Congress to have authority to enact its spending
condition416 and can easily become confused with coercion’s independence
element. After a lengthy germaneness analysis, Mr. Koenig finally concluded that Megan’s Law was germane to the purpose of law enforcement funding because the goal of releasing a sex offender’s information was to deter
crime, which is a traditional function of law enforcement.417
It is somewhat unclear whether the condition in Megan’s Law is independent from the JAG grant. One the one hand, when contrasted with Dole,
the condition does not seem like an independent condition. In Dole, the
drinking age condition was independent because it “was not a restriction on
how the highway funds—set aside for specific highway improvement and
maintenance efforts—were to be used.”418 However, “[t]he condition Congress imposed on the states with the passage of Megan’s Law specifies how
some of the federal money is to be spent by local law enforcement agencies—to release information pertaining to sex offenders necessary to protect
the public.”419 Moreover, there are significant structural differences between
the Medicaid expansion and Megan’s Law. The Medicaid expansion provided for the new recipients to be covered with completely different funds than
the original Medicaid recipients.420 Megan’s Law, however, uses the original
threatened federal funding to expand state law enforcement programs.421 In
addition, many states’ law enforcement agencies prior to Megan’s Law “frequently compile[d] and retain[ed] information pertaining to convicted offenders,”422 many of which were sex offenders.423 “Additionally, police
[would] often make [this] information available to the public when doing so
would aid in the apprehension of a suspect.”424 This is in contrast to the
Medicaid expansion, which had never before covered all individuals under
the age of 65 with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty line.425 Thus,

415. Koenig, supra note 273, at 758.
416. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 & 218 n.3 (1987).
417. See Koenig, supra note 273, at 757–58.
418. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ); see also Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 916.
419. Koenig, supra note 273, at 756.
420. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
421. See Koenig, supra note 273, at 756.
422. Id. at 757.
423. See id. at 724–25.
424. Id. at 757.
425. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
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there is a strong argument that Megan’s Law is not an independent program
but is simply a continuation of something law enforcement has always done.
On the other hand, because releasing relevant information about sex offenders is only one aspect of law enforcement, Megan’s Law could also be
seen as independent. The plurality opinion was somewhat unclear where to
draw the line—even the Medicaid expansion was a toss-up.426 At first
glance, the Medicaid expansion seemed like it was simply another change to
a federal program—something Congress has always done. Before the expansion, Medicaid covered four particular groups.427 After the expansion,
however, Medicaid was required to cover those four groups plus an additional other large group.428 Although Congress claimed that all of these
groups were part of one health care program, the plurality did not agree.429
To the plurality, there were now two different health care programs—one
old Medicaid program and one new Medicaid program.430 The old Medicaid
program would cover the original four groups, and the new Medicaid program would cover this new expansive group of uninsured individuals.431
There is an argument that Megan’s Law accomplishes the same outcome.
There are other aspects of law enforcement other than providing sex offender information to the public; however, this particular condition under Megan’s Law covers only that aspect.432 Thus there are now two different law
enforcement programs—the original all-encompassing law enforcement
program and a new law enforcement program designed to deal solely with
sex offender information. Therefore, one could argue that, like the Medicaid
expansion, Congress is using the funding for states’ current law enforcement
programs as leverage to force them to accept this new and independent law
enforcement program known as Megan’s Law.
3.

Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, it is highly probable that Mr. Koenig’s
conclusion back in 1998 would still be correct today: Megan’s Law is not an
unconstitutional use of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The threatened JAG grant amounts to such a small
amount of money and Congress is only threatening to revoke a mere ten
percent of it. These two factors make it next-to-impossible for the condition
426. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
427. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
428. Id. at 2606.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 2605–06.
432. 42 U.S.C. § 16921(b) (2006).
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to meet the significance element of coercion. If Professor Bagenstos is correct and “[c]oercion is present only when the new condition ties continued
participation in an entrenched and lucrative funding program to a state’s
agreement also to participate in a separate and independent program,”433 it is
unnecessary to even move to the next element of the coercion test. Thus,
although it is unclear whether Megan’s Law satisfies the independence element, it is irrelevant because the threatened JAG grant does not rise to a
requisite level of significance under the NFIB v. Sebelius standard.
Furthermore, even under an interpretation using unconscionability
principles, Megan’s Law would still likely be constitutional. Regardless of
the independence element’s outcome, it is likely that no court would find
enough significance to balance out a sliding scale of coercion. Therefore,
although Megan’s Law might have, at first glance, prompted an initial coercion analysis, even after NFIB v. Sebelius, it is highly unlikely that any state
would have a chance at proving its case of coercion to the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite all of the initial fear that arose after the Supreme Court’s
spending clause ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius, a powerful argument can be
made that the Court did not disrupt the status quo. Congress’s ability to
place conditions on the federal grants it distributes remains largely intact.
This case, however, still remains incredibly important. Before this case, a
state’s argument that a federal condition was coercive was doomed in any
court. Although the pendulum has not swung in the complete opposite direction since NFIB v. Sebelius, the states should at least now be able to get their
coercion argument in the door of the lower court system. While it may still
be too soon to tell the outcome of future state litigation based on the NFIB v.
Sebelius decision, one thing is for certain with the lower courts: the significance and independence elements will play a huge role in their decisionmaking process of whether a federal condition is coercive.
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